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1. Introduction 
During the 1990s Ukraine underwent a dramatic period of reforms, well in accordance with the 
“Washington consensus triad” of liberalization, stabilization and privatization. Initially Ukraine 
lagged behind Russia in its market reforms but it managed to catch up as a result of quite 
comprehensive reforms undertaken after the 1998 crisis that have mostly accomplished the 
country’s transition to a market economy. By 2004 Ukraine has become one of world’s leaders in 
growth of per capita GDP nonetheless this transition is still incomplete and burdened with pervasive 
rent seeking.  
While the actual occurrence of effective reforms seems to be out of question, the particular 
motivation for, and the mechanism of political decisions to implement reforms raises controversies. 
The question “Why to reform?” is therefore a key to understand the Ukrainian transition, as well as, 
perhaps, similar historical processes in the other post-Soviet countries and maybe some other rent-
seeking societies (Krueger, 1974) too. Providing the right answer to this question turns out non-
trivial and mostly overlooked in the literature.  
For the purpose of this work we define a rent-seeking society as a two-sector economy, where the 
rent-seeking sector initially prevails over the value-adding one. As the rent we understand any kind 
of income originated from the explicit (e.g. subsidies) or implicit (e.g. protectionism or monopoly 
power3) involuntary re-distribution of the value created by others; or appropriation of already 
existing wealth (e.g. natural rents or historical legacies)4. Respectively, three kinds of institutions 
are needed to eliminate the rent seeking defined in such a way. 
- property rights, hereinafter understood as residual rights of control over any kinds of 
property, including the public funds  
- market competition, and 
- effective state governance able to prevent private appropriation of the natural rent, socially 
inefficient allocation of budget spending, or ill regulation of the natural monopolies. 
These institutions are interrelated to each other.  
                                                    
3 In the case of natural monopolies, when a “market” value cannot be defined by competition, the definition of a monopoly 
rent is vague  
4 all kinds of market distortions, including the restrictions on competition (like protectionism, collusion, and protected 
monopolies), are sources of rents. The major ones include also any gains from the forced deals, such as open or hidden 
redistribution through the state budget (in both cases the State’s coercive force is used); and the natural sources, 
including natural monopolies.  
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A protected monopoly actually violates the control rights of consumers by limiting their choice, as 
well as the rights of the would-be competitors in using their assets for entering the protected 
markets. But even more important for our consideration, weak property rights are inconsistent with 
competition.  
By Demsetz (1967), the private property rights can be regarded as a special sort of restrictions on 
competition protecting the potential sources of rents from overappropriation (known as “the tragedy 
of the commons”) by restricting the use of them to the owners, and in such a way internalizing the 
respective externalities. Should the property rights are weak, some other institutions emerge to 
control and coordinate the rent seeking in order to protect the vitally needed rent sources (as 
production assets) from overappropriation. But a market niche can be equally considered as 
exhaustible source of monopoly rent subject to overappropriation. Unlike the private property rights, 
which, as a rule, selectively protect those rent sources increasing the social wealth, any kinds of 
alternative institutions tend to restrict the market competition too.  
On the other hand, sufficient contraction of the rent seeking is therefore a necessary condition for 
establishment of the property rights, as well as for emergence of a truly reformist government. 
Sonin (2003), Polishchuk and Savvateev (2000), and Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) show that the 
wealthiest (“oligarchs”) are not interested in the establishment of property rights and good 
governance as long as lucrative rent seeking opportunities associated with weak rule of law persist. 
If also those voters having little stake in such rents are politically underrepresented, the state may 
become “captured” by oligarchs (Hellman, 1998; Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000), thus 
unwilling to undertake the reforms potentially subversive for rent seeking.  
However, historically similar kinds of ‘bad’ long-run equilibrium (Sonin, 2002) can be found in 
different countries, including those nonetheless managed to become the mature market democracies 
nowadays. So, there should be some way out of the above-described vicious circle. On this way a 
rent-seeking society should undergo essential changes occurring nevertheless no major political 
force is interested in them. We argue that this is exactly what happened in Ukraine in the second half 
of 20th century. Here all major changes took place not as deliberately sequenced market reforms 
conducted by a benevolent government (as considered in the normative literature), but instead were 
imposed on the authorities as a sort of self-produced fait accompli in the transition process, or were 
undertaken as unavoidable emergency measures necessary to prevent or overcome a crisis.  
Some theoretical models provide for such opportunity. McGuire and Olson (1996) suggest that a 
rational encompassing rent seeking ruler should still provide some amount of public goods to ensure 
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the economic efficiency, thus restrain the rent-seeking, in order of maximizing his5 own rent. Dixit, 
Grossman and Helpman (1997) show how he can accomplish this by playing divide-and-rule even 
while being “captured” with diverse rent-seeking interests. But these models taken alone seem to be 
inconsistent with observed persistence of the rent seeking. Mere combination of them with the ones 
of the ‘bad’ equilibrium, even if possible, is still insufficient for understanding of evolution of a 
rent-seeking society because the critically important questions arise:  
When and Why a rent-seeking society remains relatively stable for some periods of time? What 
should change to make it reforming? Which forces may eventually drive a rent-seeking society out 
of the ‘bad’ long-run equilibrium of the above-described kind? How do they do that? 
While these driving forces may vary from case to case, they should be exogenous to the political-
economic factors responsible for ‘bad’ equilibriums. In application to Ukraine, Paskhaver (2003) 
classifies the reforms of 1990s as a sort of revolution that he defined as “radical changes driven by 
some exogenous forces remaining out of government’s control” caused by an “exogenous challenge 
of modernization” that Ukraine had faced. 
However, the mechanisms that transmit such long-term modernization trends and external shocks 
into eventually successful economic and political reforms still remain unclear. Our study attempts to 
fill this gap in the case of Ukraine of the 1990s. Based on our analysis, we try to identify right 
policies to enable a rent-seeking society of similar kind to undertake and implement reforms in 
order to establish modern competitive market and procure economic growth.  
In the second part we analyze some political and societal dimensions of a rent-seeking society 
allowing us to formulate the respective conditions for its sustainability.  
We describe a political economy of a rent-seeking society in terms of a hierarchical “arbiter-clients” 
model. We argue that at least at certain stage of societal evolution, a rent-seeking society may need 
an authoritarian ruler (“arbiter”) as a second best arrangement able to prevent the overappropriation 
or dissipation of rents. Such arbiter, in turn, suppresses or crowds out social capital (Putnam, 1992 
\\\), democratic institutions, and other alternative societal and political mechanisms that could 
replace him in this role. Under such a polity, the rest of major rent seeking players (usually referred 
as “oligarchs” or “clans”) become clients of the arbiter.  
At the societal level, the people have no reason to overcome the rent seeking and develop the market 
institutions as long as they perceive the market transactions as a sort of zero-sum game, and hence 
fail to realize the advantages of market reallocation over the coerced redistribution. But such 
                                                    
5 Such rulers are almost exclusively male, since their rule is essentially based on patrimonial institutions. Of course, this 
can hardly be regarded as a compliment to the men.  
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perception reflects the fact that the rent – as opposite to efficiency gains stemming from the market 
transactions – is prevailing source of above-average wealth in a rent-seeking society. Besides, 
deadweight losses from the limits on competition are intuitively unobvious, while the ones incurred 
by overappropriation resulting from unconstrained competition for rents are easily visible. These 
factors legitimize arbiter’s coercive control and coordination. 
Combining these arguments with above-cited description of a ‘bad’ equilibrium we state that a rent-
seeking society led by sufficiently strong arbiter is a self-sustaining system. 
However, unlike the above-cited studies, our model demonstrates how the increase in cost of 
centralized control and coordination of economic activities (in turn, caused by technological and 
societal evolutions) begets a “gap of control”, which leads to overappropriation of rents6, hence to a 
crisis. The latter sometimes can be resolved by temporary restoration of authoritarian or totalitarian 
control and coordination. But if the process of decay went too far, partial implementation of the 
market institutions in certain sectors becomes “second best” for the rent seekers in power as long as 
they fail to control these sectors anyway.  
Meanwhile, before such reform takes place, the intermediate non-encompassing rent-seeking 
arrangements mushroom in the uncontrolled sectors. They are often persistent and resisting to 
implementation or completion of reforms, thus preventing closing of the gap of control. The 
described mechanism determines both the particular way in which the reforms in transition went out 
(“How?”), and their outcomes (“How well?”). 
From this perspective, in the Section 3 we analyze the main institutional and politico-economic 
patterns of the late Soviet society. We argue that the economic and administrative elites of at least 
late Soviet times were predominantly rent-seekers tightly controlled and coordinated by the power-
maximizing arbiters, mostly associated with the Communist nomenklatura. This approach helps us 
identifying the roots and nature of ‘nachal’niks’, “red directors” and “business-administrative 
groups” (“oligarchs”) that further played key roles in transition. We can also trace the connection 
between societal evolution and deterioration of control in this particular case: disappointment in the 
communist ideology has undermined the legitimacy of the Communist Party, which was the main 
arbiter in charge of control and coordination.  
In the Section 4 we argue that erosion of totalitarian control in the USSR that has led to the reforms 
under our consideration started at least with Stalin’s death, almost forty years before the reforms 
actually begun. This long-term decay, not the first wave of reforms (1992) themselves, created the 
gap of control, which resulted in deep initial recession that we describe in the Section 5. Then, this 
                                                    
6 Possible decrease in sources of rent caused by both internal and external factors may have similar effect 
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gap was mostly closed in two further waves of reforms that occur in the years of 1994-96 (Section 
6) and 1999-2001 (Section 7). 
When the gap of control is considered, it becomes clear that the drastic nature of price liberalization 
in Ukraine was inevitable outcome of the avalanche-like destruction of Soviet system, not just 
implementation of some radical reformers’ ideas. Rather the reformers were called up to power in 
Russia and Poland because they were better prepared for managing of such drastic but unavoidable 
measures. The Ukrainian government had to lift the price controls simultaneously with the Russian 
one regardless to its initial intentions. But in Ukraine those times the reformers were even weaker 
politically, than they were in Russia, so the institutional and structural reforms needed for closing 
the gap of control were delayed even further. As a result, in the early 1990s in Ukraine a sort of 
“market socialism” emerged. Its main actors were state-owned enterprises poorly controlled by the 
authorities. While operating under free pricing, they still were subsidized by soft crediting, open 
subsidies, and cheap energy imports from Russia. Five-digit hyperinflation and severe economic 
recession were outcomes of this arrangement. We attribute these shortfalls to overwhelming political 
domination of red directors lacking the arbiters able to prevent overappropriation. 
In the Section 6 we show how the overappropriation of the major initial sources of rent – primarily, 
increase in relative prices of energy, and exhausting of the revenues generated from “inflation tax” – 
has brought about a relatively strong authoritarian arbiter (President Kuchma) that has partly 
restored the control and coordination. But full restoration (i.e. return to the totalitarian regime) was 
impossible; and the Ukrainian red directors in mass appeared hardly manageable clients for him as 
an arbiter. So, Kuchma has to undertake the first wave of reforms including monetary stabilization 
and mass privatization – even contrary to his initial intentions and electoral pledges.  
We demonstrate how these reforms have partly closed the gap of control by some strengthening of 
the property rights. Just like Yeltsyn, Kuchma became an arbiter of business-administrative groups, 
which had benefited from reforms ex post, though were too weak to undertake them beforehand. 
However, while succeeded in preventing the collapse, these measures appeared insufficient for 
jump-starting of the economy. Instead they resulted in an arrangement often referred to as the 
“virtual economy” (Ickes and Gaddy, 1998) – an obscure pseudo-market economy pervaded with 
false accounting, non-payments, barter, budget arrears and diverse other non-transparent procedures 
of payments needed to cover up rent seeking. It was supported by rents stem from irresponsible 
external borrowing facilitated by paternalistic treatment of Ukraine by international donors.  
But these external sources were soon overappropriated too, which caused the crisis of 1998-99, as 
described in Section 7. Similarly to the situation of 1994-95, this crisis, although less severe, has 
brought about a second wave of reforms: fiscal stabilization and dramatic reduction of state 
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paternalism towards the enterprises. These reforms resulted in economic growth and improvements 
in well-being of broad population, which made them popular. One can also argue that these events 
made the way to the Orange Revolution of 2004; however now it is still too early to make any 
confident statements. 
The Section 8 sums up the intermediate outcomes of these changes. We show that as a result of 
reforms the gap of control was mostly closed, so the country has returned to the path of growth. 
However, the deepness of this gap, and procrastination with necessary reforms at the late Soviet 
times resulted in proliferation of the malicious temporary arrangements that largely contributed to 
creation of Polterovich’s (2001) institutional traps preventing the establishment of property rights 
and market coordination, thus further magnifying the social cost of the whole process of this 
dramatic change.  
The main lesson from this exercise is that reforms can occur even if there is no major political force 
interested in them. They may appear chaotic, procrastinated, and incomplete, and thus failing to 
prevent from high social cost incurred by the persistence of the gap of control. Yet, this may be the 
only way in which modernization of a rent-seeking society can proceed. 
2. The Model 
2.1 The problem of coordination in a rent seeking society of 
Ukraine 
Uncoordinated rent seeking leads to the overappropriation of sources of rent (“overfishing”), or 
dissipation of rent for counterproductive fighting (as described by Tullock, 1980). Here are few 
examples particularly important for the case of Ukraine. 
Poorly controlled production assets (e.g. the state-owned ones under a weak or docile government) 
become swarmed with parasite firms competing in their stripping. The state budget becomes 
overappropriated by uncoordinated interest groups. As a result, either inflation or overtaxing 
deteriorates the tax base, as described by Tornell and Velasco (1992). So does the “mirrored” 
phenomena of tax evasion and lobbying for tax privileges studied by Kaufmann, et al. (1999). The 
uncoordinated complementary monopolies competing for their shares in the total monopoly rent set 
their prices higher, and the output lower, than a single monopoly does; so the deadweight loss from 
monopolization increases (Cournot, 1838).  
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The well-established and allocated property rights7 could either solve these problems completely, or 
open the way for efficient reallocation of ownership (as in the case of complementary monopolies). 
But if they are weak or fuzzy, a socio-economic system, to be sustainable at least in a short run, 
needs some other source of coordination. Such coordination is Pareto improving, thus both the 
society and the rent seekers are expected to accept any viable alternative. For example, a strong 
archaic tradition can forbid any kind of competition at all and set up strict quotas for the rent 
appropriation; or sufficient social capital can help the potential competitors to reach an agreement.  
Ukraine has inherited another kind of coordination arrangement that we called “arbiter-client 
hierarchy”. Here the coordination is secured by a third party player akin to Mancur Olson’s 
stationary bandit unable to extract the rent by himself, but instead endowed with a monopoly on 
coercive force. We call him an arbiter because it is empowered to (a) divide the “quotas” on rent 
arbitrary at his own discretion, and (b) enforce his decisions. Under these conditions, he is able to 
extort the rent collected by the other players (for example, through auctioning of quotas), or trade 
some of it for the political loyalty. In such a way he becomes a paternalistic principal (patron) 
“employing” the non-coercive rent seekers as his agents (clients) collecting the rent for himi. In 
effect, an arbiter acts like a landlord that owns8 the rent sources but allows his clients to take away 
some rent as a reward for bringing the revenues for him.  
In a rent-seeking society such arbiter-clients structures form a hierarchy, where every senior arbiter 
coordinates the rent seeking at his level, so the lower-level arbiters are among his clients, along with 
the rent-seeking firms of the respective level. This allows, at least potentially, for arranging of the 
control and coordination at all levels basing on similar principles embodied in the (patrimonial) 
societal norms.  
2.2 A rent-seeking society as a system 
Once empowered to protect the natural sources of rent and public property, an arbiter gets an 
interest and means to expand his power and enhance his rent by suppressing competition (e.g. by 
enforcing the cartels) in the other sectors. Noteworthy, in such a way he creates the Cournot’s 
complementary monopolies, thus has to become engaged in the coordination of them too. Unlike the 
arbiter’s initial role, such interventions decrease the peoples’ well-being, so the truly rational people 
should resist to them. Proliferation of the rent seeking also violates the property rights, so the 
competitive firms should oppose to it. In this struggle they might rely on people’s support, since 
they are wealth enhancers. However, 
                                                    
7 in the above-described meaning, hence including the ones of control over the government spending 
8 In terms of residual rights of control and the cash flow rights – which not necessarily imply any title ownership. 
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• as long as an arbiter provides alternative source of coordination, his very existence 
undermines necessity in the social capital needed for collective actions (Olson, 1965). This 
can explain why the latter remains weak under authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (as 
observed by Putnam et al., 1993). 
• the archaic public consciousness treats an economy as a sort of zero-sum game of “cutting a 
pie” (the perception known in anthropology as a “limited good” one (Foster, 1965)). Such a 
consciousness fails to distinguish between economic profits9, and rents stemming from the 
forced redistribution; and hence treats any above-average wealth as a result of “theft” unless 
it is granted by the authorities as a “fair” reward. The people endowed with such kind of 
perceptions actually support the rent seeking in two ways. 
On the one hand, they see no virtues in the market coordination comparing to the one conducted by 
an arbiter. Moreover, they demand and expect a part of rent to be redistributed in their favor as a 
reward for their loyalty to the ruler. In such a way an arbiter gets legitimization, while the people 
become the rent seekers themselves.  
On the other hand, firms are not interested in abstaining from the rent seeking, since their property 
is equally illegitimate regardless to its origin. Thus, even a truly honest firm cannot appeal to the 
public for the protection of its property rights abused by an arbiter or even by another firm. Under 
such circumstances, the overwhelming majority of business seeks the rent as long as it brings higher 
returns, so the “perception of limited good” becomes self-fulfilling. 
These feedbacks make such political-economic system self-sustainable during a certain period of 
time despite its numerous deficiencies (among all, studied by Shleifer et al., 1993; Murphy et al., 
1991). Moreover, this system can reincarnate even after some of its components were removed. For 
example, if an arbiter disappears for some reason, but the rent seekers remain, nothing prevents 
from the uncoordinated rent seeking that soon leads to the overappropriation. If the public 
consciousness remain unchanged, another “stationary bandit” gets welcomed to come and “restore 
an order” in the same manner. If, on the contrary, some particular source of rents disappears, an 
arbiter has vested interest in finding a substitute. 
2.3 Reforms under the rent seeking 
Similarly to Coase’s theory of a firm, a rent-maximizing (authoritarian, an even plutocratic) ruler 
being an arbiter in the above-described meaning would expand his controls only as long as the gain 
(marginal rent) from an additional “unit” of control would exceed its cost (including both the one-
                                                    
9 The ones stemming from market reallocation and efficiency gains, which increase the well-being 
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shot cost of seizing, and the cost of operation). Likewise, a rational power-maximizing (totalitarian) 
ruler can go as far as the total rent he gains covers the total cost of control and coordination. These 
constraints rein in the size of a rent-seeking sector, thus leave some room for the property rights and 
economic freedom. Both existed to some extent even under the deliberately and ideologically 
totalitarian Soviet regime.  
Furthermore, the arbiter’s control and forced coordination tend to deteriorate with time. The long-
term tendencies in public consciousness (like erosion in the patrimonial norms of implicit obedience 
to the authoritarian rule and tradition) undermine the arbiter’s control. Technical progress increases 
the range of goods, and brings instant technological change. Both these effects complicate the 
coordination10. Therefore, the cost of control and coordination tends to increase with time. On the 
other hand, the same tendencies aggravate arbiter-client difficulties, thus increase clients’ bargaining 
power in their negotiations with an arbiter. This, in turn, further decreases the rent in his disposal.  
Such changes in the cost-benefit balance make the arbiter’s control and coordination in certain 
spheres less effective in preventing from overappropriation, unjustified (for an authoritarian ruler), 
or unaffordable (for a totalitarian one). As “second best”, an arbiter becomes interested in partial 
abandoning of his control and coordination – we classify such move as the first phase of reforms. 
Notably, these reforms occur as at least partly “passive” acceptance of realities (ineffectiveness of 
control and coordination), rather then deliberate move towards the market economy.  
An authoritarian arbiter is also interested in maximization of efficiency of the residual value-adding 
sector (as in Olson and McGuire, 199\\\), because at least part of this value, although indirectly, can 
contribute to his rent. Thus, a rational arbiter would also deliberately promote replacing of the 
abandoned part of his control and coordination with the market and democratic institutions, which 
should constitute the second phase of reform. Therefore, the complete reform downsizes the rent-
seeking sector. 
We call such reforms systemic because while reaching certain critical mass they eventually change 
the fundamental balance between the rent-seeking and value-adding sectors, so destroy the whole 
system of rent-seeking society described above.  
Should the successful piecemeal reforms be always possible, a rational arbiter would undertake 
them instantly, accordingly to the change in above-described fundamentals. However, in reality: 
• An arbiter operates with imperfect information, and not always can assess his real capacities 
properly; 
                                                    
10 as Von Mizes (1924) has shown, the problem of optimal allocation of sufficiently large number of production articles 
cannot be solved within the reasonable time frame and with the necessary precision. 
16-May-07 11
• He is not always strong enough to overcome the resistance of those of his clients that are 
afraid to lose from such reforms; 
• Public consciousness formed under the rent-seeking society should undergo a time-
consuming evolution in order to make the market and democratic institutions effective. This 
evolution starts only with the first phase of reforms.  
• Partial implementation of market and democratic mechanisms is often counterproductive11. 
But their full-fledge establishment (e.g. universal protection for the property rights) is 
undesirable for the rent seekers, including the arbiter. Therefore, unlike a “benevolent” 
reformist government, arbiter as a decision-maker is more afraid of completion of reforms, 
than concerned about their failure; 
• Finally, a totalitarian arbiter being self-constrained with ideological dogmas may fail to find 
an ideological justification for reforms. 
As a result, the reforms become delayed12. Consequently, certain spheres remain out of any kind of 
effective control and coordination for a while, so become subject to overappropriation. Such gap of 
control emerges before a systemic reform starts. Once emerged, it begets the informal rent-seeking 
social practices (like corruption, smuggling or black market activities) and respective structures 
(like mafia).  
These practices and structures fill the discrepancy between the formal and actual institutional 
arrangements. For example, before the systemic reform occurs, they may partly compensate for the 
allocation failures with arbitraging. Those parasitizing at the part of the rent-seeking sector that an 
arbiter fails to control often support the first phase of reforms, because they win from deepening of 
the gap of control caused by lifting of the remnants of arbiter’s control and coordination. But such 
intermediate winners13 (Hellman, 1998) have vested interests in suspending of reforms after the first 
phase, thus preserving them partial. The longer is initial delay, the deeper and lasting the gap of 
control, the stronger become intermediate winners and the more established and embedded 
arrangements they create, the more difficult is implementation and completion of the second phase, 
the higher total cost of change. Noteworthy, unlike the case of reforms conduced by reformist 
government, as usually considered in the normative literature, in a rent-seeking society the main 
                                                    
11 For example, partial price liberalization can magnify the distortions, thus may lead to increase in rent seeking. 
12 these reasons for delayed reforms seem to be more relevant to the case of Ukraine (described with our arbiter-client 
model) then the ones described in the literature on Latin America, like the war of attrition  
13 We will use this term to denote the set of players involved in the above-described informal rent-seeking arrangements 
and practices, thus interested in deepening and prolongation of the gap of control. However, unlike Hellman (1998), 
Polterovich (2001), and other scholars of post-Soviet transition representing the same line of thought, we emphasize that 
the true source of rents begetting the intermediate winners is not the first phase of reforms itself, but the gap of control 
created by procrastination in these reforms. 
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losses are caused (directly and indirectly) by deterioration of arbiter’s control and coordination not 
accompanied by the reforms.14 
Stiglitz (1999) argues that reversing of sequence of above-described phases of reforms could 
prevent from partial reforming. But the formal market and democratic institutions can be effective 
only when they are backed with the informal ones (North, 1990), which, in turn, emerge only in 
response to the societal demand for them. This process takes time, and usually starts only when the 
arbiter’s control and coordination are formally removed (Paskhaver, 2003). Although such first 
phase of reforms may further deepen the gap of control, unlike deterioration of arbiter’s control and 
coordination it opens the way for development of the competitive market’s players and institutions. 
Thus, the intermediate winners play initially positive role by providing a payable demand for 
launching of the reforms, but then make them stalemated in the ‘bad’ equilibrium of partial reforms 
described in the literature cited above.  
Our main argument is that such equilibriums are unsustainable in a long run. Unlike an arbiter, 
the intermediate winners are not encompassing, therefore behave predatory. In the most cases, they 
lack the internal mechanisms of coordination, because initially their rent seeking activities were 
anyway constrained by the arbiter’s residual control. If the alternative sources of coordination, like 
social capital, are weak (as they are under the arbiter’s rule), nothing prevent intermediate winners 
from overappropriation or dissipation of rent. The resulting crisis, on the one hand, weakens the 
intermediate winners; while one the other hand makes an arbiter interested in implementation of the 
second phase of reforms. Thus, in-line with Drazen and Easterly (2001), crisis does facilitate further 
completion of reforms. 
Still, an arbiter is interested in suspending of the further reforms as soon as the particular crisis of 
overappropriation is overcome. For this reason, each crisis results in a new temporary rent-seeking 
equilibrium. But any incomplete set of market institutions is unsustainable, so a new crisis comes 
soon. Subsequent crises and respective systemic reforms come one by one as a chain reaction. It 
goes on until the rent-seeking sector contracts far enough that the market control and coordination 
become dominating; so the competitive market sector can become a basis for the pro-market and 
pro-democratic political forces. 
The second phase of reforms produces immediate welfare gains, and therefore can become popular. 
In this way the systemic reforms can get a posteriori public support resulting from a sort of learning-
by-doing process. Eventually it transforms into the active civic movement in support of the property 
                                                    
14 Although overappropriation of the monopoly rents brings immediate welfare gains, they usually can just partly offset 
these losses. The short-term welfare losses from monopolization are rather low (Leibenstein, 1966). The losses caused 
by insufficient competitive selection may be much higher, but they do not disappear immediately with breaking up of the 
monopolies 
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rights, market competition, and democratic control over the state. Starting from this point, the public 
vote can become an engine for the further reforms; the reforms become proactive, so the new 
institutions already emerged in the market sector can crowd out the arbiter’s control and 
coordination with no gaps of control. 
2.4 Hypotheses:  
1. Economic reforms can occur without a public mandate. They can be driven by the interplay 
of rent-seeking interests. 
2. In a rent-seeking society, diminishing of rent (manifesting itself in economic crises) 
eventually promotes expansion of the competitive market sector, strengthening of the 
property rights and the rule of law, and indirectly facilitates democratization.  
3. Social costs of changes are determined mostly by deepness and longitude of deterioration in 
the direct control and coordination, which precedes the reforms. The longer the 
procrastination of reforms, the higher costs. The faster the market institutions take place of 
direct control and coordination, the lower social costs. Thus, (1) the delayed, slow and 
inconsistent reforms are more costly; (2) the availability of rent can ultimately increase the 
social cost of reforms instead of mitigating them, unless this rent goes directly to the broad 
population.  
4. External factors (like foreign aid) facilitate the reforms when and where they help 
strengthening of the property rights and competition, and restraining of the rent seeking. But 
they can do harm while providing authorities with sources of rents that can be used as a 
substitute to reforms. 
5. Reforms can lead to the immediate gains (and thus can become popular) to the extent they 
establish universal protection of the property rights, promote the market reallocation, 
competition, etc., and improve the public (democratic) control over the natural rents. 
6. Evolution of public consciousness largely determines the course of reforms. Particularly, 
deterioration in the patrimonial norms undermines the direct control and coordination; while 
its specific part – a “zero-sum” view on the economic activities, along with paternalism, 
prevent from establishing of the market institutions. Together these factors indirectly 
determine the social cost of changes.  
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3. Initial preconditions: institutional patterns and major 
political-economic players 
Within our framework, the Soviet state was a specific kind of totalitarian arbiter-clients hierarchy 
pretending to be a rationally ruled lawful state. Its main informal institutional features persisted over 
time and largely shaped the institutions of post-Soviet period. 
Soviet legislation was based on Marxism, which is the follow-out system of “zero-sum” views on 
society, polity, and economy. Market transactions, except retail, were prohibited and replaced with 
redistribution; while all kinds of official earnings were strictly regulated with little, if any, 
connection to the value added15. Thus, in our definition the USSR was a follow-out rent-seeking 
society. Yet, the rents were rarely monetized, and inequality usually associated with rent seeking 
was quite low due to the totalitarian (hence, power-maximizing, in our terms) nature of the system. 
The most of rent was traded for loyalty of the critically important social groups16, dissipated for 
coordination and control; and used for maintaining and increasing of the military power. 
But the control and coordination of such encompassing rent-seeking sector appeared infeasible from 
the very beginning. Meanwhile, the communist regime could not coexist with any substantial 
market sector, because the latter have been “permanently begetting the capitalism” (Lenin) by 
questioning of the necessity in central planning. Fortunately for the communists, Russia has a deep-
rooted tradition of “soft” rule of law. According to this tradition, legislation is often impracticable 
(excessively severe, obscure, contradicting, incompatible with the natural law), or ambiguous. As 
long as everyone has to break such a law, everybody should be penalized – which would be, of 
course, absurd. Therefore, the law can be enforced and implemented only at the discretion of state 
executives (nachal’nik), which, in distinct to Weberian bureaucrats, have discretionary power 
(vlast’) making them arbiters, while those susceptible to this power become clients.  
“Soft budget constrains” (hereinafter – SBC) (Kornai, 1986) were the most important economic 
manifestations of “soft” rule of law. Marxist theory overstated the role of capital accumulation, 
while completely denied competitive selection, entrepreneurship, and incentives. Accordingly, the 
state endowed the enterprises with investment funds on the basis of plan tasks they were supposed 
to fulfill, regardless to their efficiency. Moreover, less efficient enterprises often were able to 
                                                    
15 the opposite, according to the labor theory of the value, the value added was defined as total cost of labor that was 
employed, directly or indirectly (in the form of the value of consumed fixed capital) in the process of production. 
16 as the workers in defense industry that earned twice as much as an engineer; or the coal miners that earned four times 
as much 
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squeeze out more funds if they succeeded in proving that they only lack investment to catch up. 
Such paternalism towards the enterprises contributed to vague and asymmetric property 
rights: while the people formally held the “title” on all of the property, and bore the losses, the 
residual rights of control were seized by nachal’niks and directors of enterprises (Boycko, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1995). Because such an arrangement was essentially informal, the actual allocation of 
control rights was vague, thus subject to permanent “hierarchical bargaining” (Gaidar, 1999). This 
problem largely determined the agenda for the whole period of reforms under consideration. 
On the other hand, ‘soft’ rule of law is unsustainable without an effective arbiter-client hierarchy, 
because vague and asymmetric property rights typically result in overappropriation. But, by 
Klitgaard (1988), “monopoly + discretion – accountability = corruption”, which undermines the 
control and coordination. As the monopoly and discretion were essential parts of the system, 
accountability was crucial for its survival. In the absence of democratic oversight and ‘checks and 
balances’ inconsistent with the ideology, the accountability was secured by the Communist party.  
Its leaders of respective levels were put in the positions of arbiters in hierarchical bargaining and 
scrutinized the consistency of discretionary decisions with the communist ideology. At the same 
time, they were personally responsible for the fulfillment of plan tasks at their territories 
(nonetheless they did not have any production facilities in their direct disposal!), and accountable to 
the higher-level Party leaders. In such a way, digressions from Marxism-based regulations that were 
vital for the survival of Soviet system (Smith and Swain, 1998) were kept under informal control. 
On the other hand, this made the pseudo democratic lawful state just a cover-up for actual arbiter-
clients hierarchy. Communist ideology provided a universal normative basis for all levels of this 
hierarchy and ensured total domination of the same ideological values within the society, hence 
secured the legitimacy of power.  
Marxism has also required elimination of the material incentives, and replacing them with the moral 
ones. But the artificially imposed equality has been largely reducing the labor incentives (Ryvkina, 
1998), while the “strong” (e.g. entrepreneurial) ones were banned completely. The Communist 
ideology attempted, sometimes successfully, to substitute them with ideologically-based incentives 
combined with career opportunities. 
Finally, the Communist party was an instrument providing the feedbacks for the higher levels of 
hierarchy.  
Thus, it was a core of the whole system.  
Control over the appointments was the main instrument for these critically important tasks. The 
Communist party officials were the main kind of arbiters at each stage of hierarchy, because they 
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had veto right on the promotions and demotions of all other nachal’niks of the same level of 
nomenklatura. While the formal criteria for promotion were opaque, controllability based on 
compromat – the files of violations, and other facts that can be used for blackmailing – was one of 
the main factors. Such files were kept on all nomenklatura members, and used as a stick for making 
them obedient.  
Flagrant violators, as well as fully law-abeyant individuals, or the ones just insufficiently loyal to 
the boss, were rarely promoted. Some lawbreakers were weaved and promoted if they were able to 
convince the Party leaders that their violations were aimed at “common good”, while they 
personally got no benefits. Meanwhile, limited abuses of power were tolerated in order to make the 
power-maximizing (precisely speaking, vlast’-maximizing) strategy rational for nomenklatura 
members, even despite relatively modest material rents it brought. So, nomenklatura was largely 
composed of risk-taking individuals, although used to deal with the administrative instead of 
business risks. While some degree of risk-taking was absolutely necessary for economic 
development, it has further reduced the controllability based on fear. Thus, the gap of control has 
emerged from the very beginning. 
It was filled in with all-pervading informal reputation-based interpersonal blat (Ledeneva, 1998) 
networks of reciprocal exchange with “favors” of access to the goods and services in short supply; 
career opportunities; and even the resources and facilities needed for exercising of the official roles 
(e.g. material supplies needed for the plan fulfillment) (Smith and Swain, 2002). Since such 
transactions, as the favors themselves, were often illegal, blat networks were needed to substitute 
the rule of law in reducing of the transaction costs. But although being horizontal rather then 
vertical, these networks are still not basis for social capital, because the providers of complementary 
favors rarely have common interests to defend. Thus, this kind of rent seeking remained 
uncoordinated. 
Due to the number of reasons that we are going to address in the forthcoming work, the communist 
ideology steady eroded, and control capacities of soviet system started perishing soon after Stalin’s 
death. At the same time, complication of technologies has aggravated both the principal-agent 
problem (due to increase in the information asymmetry that was especially severe in the absence of 
market pricing), and the problem of centralized coordination. With erosion of centralized control, 
the directors have been gradually seizing the residual rights of control over their enterprises, and 
uniting against the arbiters, mostly the Party leaders.  
Box 1. The main interest groups of the late Soviet society, their role before and after the crash of 
Communism. 
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Group  composition  Subculture and role aspirations and role in the 
reforms 
Nachal’niks  The CPSU and 
komsomol 
executives. 
State executives of 
the Soviet 
government of all 
levels lacking 
immediate access to 
the sources of rents  
High officers of the 
army, as well as 
police, secret 
service (KGB), and 
other law 
enforcement 
agencies.  
 
Arbiters. Sometimes – 
sincere believers in the 
Communism; sometimes – 
cynical rent-seekers, 
nachal’niks followed all 
the fallacies of an 
uncontrolled bureaucracies 
(corruption, personnel and 
task expansion, etc).  
 
As the Communist ideology 
was their source of 
legitimacy, and the 
ideologically-based 
legislation provided them 
with vlast’, the nachal’niks 
largely lost their influence 
and power with the crash of 
communism and dissolution 
of the USSR.  
The most far-sighted 
nachal’niks have managed 
to arrange some access to 
the sources of rents in 
advance through 
arbitraging, regulations, etc. 
The personal conections 
(svyasy), vlast’, and 
compromat were their main 
assets that can be converted 
into rent or its permanent 
sources. Having no direct 
access to the property, 
nachal’niks supported more 
outsider-oriented 
privatization. 
khosyaistvenniks 
as a whole 
nomenklatura 
members in charge 
with some valuable 
assets 
The main category of 
clients, and the first-wave 
intermediate winners. 
Although relatively more 
pragmatic (including the 
Aspired emancipating of 
the nachal’niks’ control and 
enhancing of rent incomes. 
Meanwhile, all but the most 
entrepreneurial 
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issues like property rights), 
clever, and sometimes 
even entrepreneurial (10-
15%) than nachal’niks, 
khosyaistvenniks were 
necessarily involved into 
the illegal exchange, and 
thus subject to criminal 
prosecution. Thus, the line 
between “normal” activity 
and corruption was very 
thin, and they crossed it 
much more often than 
nachal’niks, partly 
compensating themselves 
for lesser official 
privileges with the 
illegally gained rents.  
 
khosyaistvenniks wished to 
maintain paternalism that 
was the main source of 
such incomes. 
 
director corps – 
the main part of 
khosyaistvenniks 
 
Directors of the 
large industrial 
enterprises (known 
as so called “red 
directors”), and to 
lesser extent the 
mid-range 
industrial, transport 
and construction 
enterprises.  
Heads of the 
kolkhoz collective 
farms. 
Intermediate winners. 
Sincerely saw their 
mission (and the mission 
of their enterprises) as 
“producing the goods for 
the State”, with the latter 
ought to supply everything 
needed and facilitate the 
production.  
According to Viktor 
Lisitsky, V.Yushchenko's 
advisor in the National 
Bank and in the Council of 
Ministers, who during the 
Soviet times was 
Directors were the most 
powerful player at the early 
stages of post-Communism. 
In 1991, 46% of Ukrainian 
GDP was produced by 
heavy industries. The 
directors and heads of 
kolkhozes occupied 35% of 
parliament sits, just as 
much as nachal’niks did. 
But the latter largely felt 
lost and demoralized after 
the crash of Communism. 
(Table 1) 
Since the last years of the 
16-May-07 19
responsible for the finance 
of an industrial enterprise 
"…the directors were 
organizers rather than 
managers; they knew 
production, but lacked the 
skills of company 
management, had no idea 
of marketing, finances, 
and other things needed in 
a competitive market 
economy".17 
Instead, they were used to 
hierarchical bargaining 
characteristic to the Soviet 
economy, thus good in 
negotiating the terms to 
"push things through" in 
many instances.  
USSR directors widely 
used their power for rent 
seeking through lobbying, 
inspiration of strikes and 
political blackmailing. 
Instead of improving the 
competitiveness, directors 
engaged in bargaining with 
government for 
paternalistic “support of 
production" in exchange for 
control rights and political 
support.  
Later on their dependence 
on paternalism was actively 
used for subjecting them to 
the BAGs. 
The directors’ professional 
association, the Union of 
Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (USPP), is 
quite influential: its heads 
(L.Kuchma, A.Kinakh) 
occupied the positions of 
Prime-ministers, it has its 
own party and a faction in 
parliament.  
Finally, the directors 
succeeded in soliciting the 
election of one of them as 
the president of the country 
– under whom, ironically, 
they will lose their 
influence. 
other 
khosyaistvenniks 
Top executives of 
the non-industrial 
enterprises (trading 
and material 
supply, catering, 
customer services, 
banks, etc.) 
Heads of the 
special supply 
agencies servicing 
nomenklatura and 
the governmental 
offices with goods 
in short supply  
Heads of the public 
utility and other 
municipal services 
Intermediate winners.  
Were closely tied to the 
rest of groups within blat 
networks, since they 
immediately ruled with the 
flows of goods that were 
the most valuable source 
of the favors of access. On 
the other hand, they had 
limited access to the 
property that could 
generate rents. Besides, 
their enterprises were
subject to less pate n listic
tre tment, than the on s
“producing” [the material
goods].  
Were best suited and 
equipped for the 
unconstrained rent-seeking, 
so had particular interest in 
getting rid of arbiters’ 
control; while much less 
paternalistic. However, they 
still were against the 
consecutive liberalization 
that could undermine the 
arbitraging as a permanent 
source of rent. 
former 
underground 
Shadow economy 
operators of the 
Soviet times (so 
called 
"speculators", 
currency traders, 
smugglers, 
underground 
producers and 
distributors of 
scarce goods).  
Criminal structures, 
if they were used as 
a surrogate of 
contract and loyalty 
enforcement 
Intermediate winners.  
The most frank in 
lawbreaking, but at the 
same time the most 
entrepreneurial. 
According to Paskhaver, 
extreme degree of risk-
taking inherent to such 
kind of entrepreneurs 
largely shaped the 
corporate culture of the 
whole business elite. They 
had short time horizon; 
low trust; low social 
responsibility; etc. 
The criminal codes, 
The "underground" sector 
of Soviet economy was not 
too powerful18, yet gave 
rise to a number of 
prominent figures in post-
Communist business and 
politics.  
Active involvement of 
shadow market operators 
and criminal bosses in 
economic and political 
processes at the initial 
stages of reforms added to 
the atmosphere of 
lawlessness during the first 
years of transition. 
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 enforced by violence, 
became substitute for 
contract enforcement and 
guaranties of loyalty under 
conditions where the 
formal laws were slowly 
issued and poorly 
enforced.  
 
However, as the petty trade, 
known in the USSR as 
"speculation", by 1994 
became the occupation of 
up to a quarter of 
population, the former 
shadow economy operators 
being more experienced in 
this business obtained an 
advantage over the 
newcomers. 
Moreover, with the collapse 
of law enforcement 
agencies that were under-
financed and largely 
demoralized by new 
conditions, the criminal 
structures with their rigid 
discipline, large financial 
assets and "physical 
contract enforcement" 
became a component of 
politics.  
The politicians and 
influential businessmen 
used them as a tool for 
enforcement and “force 
competition” – in exchange 
for the patronage19, 
immunity from legal 
persecution, and the like. 
Later on the outright 
racketeering was limited 
and crowded out by the law 
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enforcement agencies.  
The involvement of such 
practices in decision-
making adds to the public 
mistrust to the incumbents, 
to the atmosphere of 
lawlessness in the society. 
labor and other 
broad groups 
employees, retirees, 
students, and other 
categories having 
neither vlast’, nor 
access to the major 
sources of rent  
The public consciousness 
was ambiguous 
(Golovakha and Panina, 
1994). 
While being the lowest-
level clients in the 
hierarchy, the people had 
highly paternalistic 
aspirations. At the same 
time, they became 
disappointed in the 
communist ideology, tired 
of permanent and 
increasing shortages, low 
quality of goods and 
services, and other 
shortcomings of Soviet 
system. They also desired 
more freedom and 
independence.  
The people’s voice was not 
adequately represented in 
politics, since both political 
and civic institutions, 
necessary for this, were 
nearly absent.  
The people, in turn, mostly 
kept silence about 
violations of the democratic 
principles, and until the 
Orange Revolution of 2004 
did not make any major 
public protest.  
However, the authorities 
always had in mind the 
possibility of unrest caused 
by economic severity. This 
made them implicitly 
constrained in their rent 
seeking, and thus indirectly 
bounded the pool of rent 
available for redistribution. 
Still, this bound remained 
opaque. 
“independent” 
entrepreneurs 
entrepreneurial 
people not 
The only relatively less 
paternalistic group. 
along with the most 
entrepreneurial 
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belonging to any of 
above-described 
categories and not 
included into the 
most powerful blat 
networks. 
Aspiration of personal 
independence from vlast’ 
is very important, if not 
the main motivation, for 
these people. However, the 
most of them lacked not 
only the ties, reputation, 
and specific skills 
necessary for entering the 
blat networks, but also the 
knowledge and skills 
needed for any kind of 
business. Also, some of 
them still behave 
paternalistically, thus seek 
a “good state” that would 
protect them. 
khosyaistvenniks, the 
independent entrepreneurs 
filled the rapidly emerging 
competitive market sector. 
However, their influence 
remained weak through all 
of the period. Some of 
them, although often 
unwillingly, adopted to the 
rules of the game and were 
co-opted by more powerful 
players that employed them 
as managers. 
The rest, either remained at 
the level of small and micro 
business, or gave up – 
emigrated, became 
employees again, and so on.
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4. Dissolution of the USSR, and price liberalization 
As a result of deteriorating control and coordination, the economic difficulties in USSR tended to 
aggravate. The crisis was postponed for a decade or two by the massive oil and gas trading 
supported with sharp increase in the world energy prices in 1970th. But sharp decrease in rent 
brought about by the decrease in oil prices, Afghan war, arm race, and some other factors in 1980th, 
along with the notorious inefficiency have ultimately made the totalitarian control and coordination 
unaffordable. However, despite the deepening gap of control that fed blat networks, nachal’niks 
were reluctant to adjustment of the rent-seeking sector. They rightly pointed out the vital importance 
of ideology, which forbade both the private property over the production assets, and the economic 
freedom.  
Meanwhile, rents provided by the widening gap of control became lucrative alternatives to the ones 
officially granted by authorities, which further distorted the incentives. In the early 1980th the 
societal values based on communist ideology have mostly eroded, so the ideological reasons were 
unable to constrain the rent seeking and paternalism, and provide the labor motivation (Table 2). 
Giving to the role of the communist party and its ideology analyzed in the Section 3, such a shift in 
public consciousness made the crash of the USSR just a question of time20.  
In 1991 the state socialism has ultimately lost its attractiveness (Table 3) and the trend was highly 
negative. In the November of 1991 56% agreed with the “Western part”, while just 12% disagreed. 
Already in January 48% suggested that they would be better off if they would live in a Western 
country than they are now, while only 4% were afraid that they would be worse off. According to 
another opinion polls, in 1990 the population in large supported the market reforms and institutions, 
including the private property, competition, etc. (Golovakha and Pakhomov, 1993). Noteworthy, the 
price liberalization has got the lowest support. 
The weakening Soviet state became unable to secure the supply of goods and services under the 
administratively set prices. Trying to fill the gap between demand and supply, Gorbachov has finally 
started downsizing the rent-seeking sector by allowing small private firms (‘cooperatives’) in 1987. 
But along with increase in supply of consumer goods and services, some of the new entrepreneurs 
(mostly those well-connected to nomenklatura through blat networks) started to gain from arbitrage 
that further aggravated the distortions. The severity of shortages at the consumer market increased in 
the late Soviet times due to the populist policies conducted on the pattern of decreasing rents. As a 
result of these developments, at the end of 1980 the forced savings reached 170-190 billion rubles, 
close to 20 percent of GDP and around one third of the existing financial assets (Cottarelli and 
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Blejer, 1991). Through all of the USSR the distribution of goods increasingly concentrated at the 
black market. 
When the nomenklatura members in mass realized the inevitable decay of totalitarian regime, the 
most of them21 started a sort of yardstick competition for the access to rents and sources of real 
power that left out of the decaying arbiter’s control. While the top-level nachal’niks lacked 
resources to preserve the totalitarian power, their clients fought for emancipation. Solnick (1996) 
compared this process to the bank run. In combination, all these processes led to the avalanche-like 
destruction of the whole system of centralized control and coordination. The main totalitarian arbiter 
– the Communist party – was dissolved and banned after the defeat of GKChP coup d'état attempt in 
August, 1991. 
Abandoning of the communist ideology opened a way for the official lifting of the remnants of 
ineffective arbiter’s controls and coordination, primarily the price control and central planning. But 
no pro-reform coalition was in place in Ukraine by the end of 1991. Among all, the policymakers 
feared that reforms will hint the integrity and independence of Ukraine that was not a mature 
political nation at this time. The directors that have just got rid of communist control behaved rather 
cautiously. Escaping from the Russian radical reformers (and, plausibly, the Russian “Kremlin 
capitalists” that were much stronger than their Ukrainian competitors those times) was the main 
genuine reason for Ukrainian nomenklatura to join the nationalists in their aspiration of 
independence22. 
The newly elected president Leonid Kravchuk, the former First Secretary for the Communist party 
of Ukraine, was an outspoken opponent of Yegor Gaidar’s “shock therapy” in Russia. However, his 
power was not nearly as strong as it used to be. At the maximum, he could become an authoritarian 
arbiter, because no source of legitimization of totalitarian power was in place. But even in this role 
he was weak: Institutionally, he could fire a prime-minister or appoint key enforcement and 
economy ministers only with the consent of the parliament. By the end of 1991 deterioration of 
control and coordination went so far, that he had to undertake the first phase of reforms regardless to 
his own views and intentions. 
The most of consumer goods were rationed since October, 1990 with the means of special coupons 
that one had to add to cash payment in order to make it valid. Furthermore, when similar factors 
caused a real threat of famine in Russia, its authorities had no choice but allowing the Gaidar's 
reform Cabinet to apply its favorite approach – lifting the state control over prices on majority of 
goods and services altogether. In Ukraine situation was not that much severe due to relatively better-
performing individual agriculture production. But when the prices in Russia were freed, the 
Ukrainian government had no choice than following up with the kind of “passive” first-phase 
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reform described in Section 3. On January 2, 1992, the Government Decree “On the System of 
Prices in National Economy and Consumers’ Market of Ukraine”23 was adopted. There was no other 
way to prevent the outflow of goods: the country had no economic borders, no own currency, and 
the production was dependent on components from throughout the USSR.  
Similarly, Ukraine has to follow the trade liberalization that was introduced in Russia in order to 
alleviate shortages and price increase caused by monopolization of the economy. Although the 
Ukrainian government of this time deserves the credit for its common sense, in Ukraine both 
reforms were not that radical, and thus granted more rent-seeking opportunities to the members of 
blat networks connected to nomenklatura. Despite explicit inability to continue the price control, the 
Cabinet of Vitold Fokin comprised of Soviet time functionaries tried to keep control over the prices 
on "critical" goods and services (foodstuffs, utilities), and "strategic" commodities, as fuel 
(Dabrowski, 1994). Such mixed policies continued until December, 1994 (Table 4). However, these 
attempts of official price limitations did not have any effect at all on the inflation rate, because the 
control was already ineffective.  
Directors appeared the main winners of this phase of reforms. 
Liberalization just reflected nachal’niks’ (as arbiters) failure in exercising control and coordination 
over the enterprises. There was no even a whole-national register for business entities, so a number 
of enterprises that were previously subordinated directly to the central ministries remained 
“uncovered” for a year or more. Since the population was also not ready for collective actions 
(unlike, for example, Poland where Solidarnoszc took control over the enterprises), khosyaistvenniks 
(primarily, the directors) have emancipated from any kind of control. The directors actually took 
over the enterprises. They have finally seized vaguely limited residual rights of control, and even, to 
some extent, the disposal rights. Meanwhile, title property rights, and respectively the formal cash 
flow rights, still belonged to the people. Moreover, being state-owned, the enterprises remained 
subject to vast state paternalism. 
Such asymmetry in the property rights meant that directors were in position of gaining the rents 
while being virtually irresponsible for the externalities they created. Furthermore, their position in 
charge of real assets made them the most powerful players of those times having overwhelming 
economic and political (because of their power over the employees, and the vast representation in 
the Parliament) power augmented with informal influence on decision-making. But nonetheless they 
comprised an allegedly “encompassing” (Olson, 1982) group (Table 1), khosyaistvenniks behaved 
predatory, because they were not organized enough to prevent overappropriation. Also, no new 
arbiter was able to coordinate them at that moment.  
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Consequently, they engaged in the unconstrained competition for rents stemming from three main 
sources: cheap Russian energy (oil and especially gas); paternalistic treatment of the state (docile to 
the demands of directors, and partly controlled by them directly); and monopoly power. While the 
first of these sources was purely external, the rest two partly served for spreading this rent over the 
rest of enterprises, although mostly benefited the directors at the expense of population.  
5. Crisis of overappropriation: why the gap of control 
was not closed?  
The crash of communism along with consequent price liberalization have further deepened the gap 
of control, but opened the way of closing it with market institutions. Weakness of the official elites 
along with the bankruptcy of its ideology, and avalanche-like decay of centralized control in 1990-
91 seemingly gave a chance to the market-oriented and democratic counter-elites. Why both market 
institutions and new elites remained weak despite seemingly high demand for them? 
The people were not ready to use the democratic institutions that were formally established. They 
lacked the social capital, and considered the state as a patron, rather than a mediator of the common 
interests. Respectively, they expected its protection and help, while being reluctant to provide 
anything in turn, and even considering it as an enemy subject to fraud – because it does not provide 
as much support as it allegedly should. 
Although the people denied the communist ideology, they were not yet ready for the consecutive 
and comprehensive market reforms able to substitute the centralized control and coordination with 
private property and market competition (Ryvkina, 1998). No direct measurements were done, but 
the indirect empirical data suggest that “zero-sum” perception was strongly dominating. The 
situation in Ukraine was similar. In 1991 84% respondents in Kyiv (a 3 millions capital city!) 
considered necessary to strengthen the “fighting the non-labor incomes” (netrudoviye dokhodi). 
Among the categories of the latter, bribing was named as the most harmful by only 15%, drug 
dealing – by 17%, while “speculation” (arbitrage trading with goods) took 25% - perhaps, due to the 
fact that under the regulated prices such a business was essentially rent seeking. 17% of respondents 
blamed the “cooperators” (private entrepreneurs allowed by Gorbachov in 1987) for “braking the 
perestroika”24. In 199325, 63% respondents supported the idea that the salaries should not be 
restrained with any upper limit, while only 19% agreed to allow the unlimited entrepreneurial 
incomes. Golovakha and Pakhomov (1993) interpret this fact as follows: the salaries were 
considered as set “fairly” by the State, while the entrepreneurial incomes were perceived as 
stemmed from redistribution.  
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Therefore, the broad population was not ready to mandate the second phase of reforms. But neither 
were the rest of major interest groups (see Box 1). Moreover, among these groups only directors 
appeared organized enough to assert their common interests, yet short-sighted and mercenary 
according to their subculture. But they were just intermediate winners benefited from the gap of 
control, thus interested in procrastination of the further reforms.  
In particular, directors, as well as BAGs (see Box 2), took advantage from asymmetry in the initial 
trade liberalization: negligible prices on energy were maintained, while exporting of the outputs at 
World market prices was allowed. The respective rents roughly proportional to the share of energy 
in total costs of inputs have created the typical Polterovich’s “institutional trap” as described in 
Babanin, Dubrovskiy, and Ivaschenko (2002). As a result, the energy-intensive industries became 
subject to paternalistic treatment to such extent that allowed them for increasing their share in total 
output despite the negative price shock (Figure 1). 
Box 2. The business-administrative groups (BAGs) 
Instead of breaking up the arbiter-clients hierarchy, the incumbents have re-arranged, incorporated 
some selected new members, and during the first post-Soviet years re-structured into the business-
administrative groups (BAGs) (Turchinov, 1997) at all levels of this hierarchy.  
A BAG is a product of evolution of a blat network constituted of nachal’niks and rent seeking 
businesses closely interrelated with each other. They have much in common with clans, mafia, 
oligarchs, and other forms of patronage. However, unlike clans, they are organized rather on the 
ground of reputation, cronyism, and cover-up, than the family links (although the latter also matter). 
Nonetheless many people identify them with mafia the BAGs rarely conduct explicitly criminal 
activities, though sometimes include or employ the criminals. Respectively, there is no formal 
inception (omerta), the rules and norms are vaguer than the “code” of the criminals is, and they 
significantly vary from one group to another.  
The BAGs are often referred as oligarchs, or the financial-industrial groups. But the essence of their 
competitive advantages is not in just large capital, or uniting of the financial capital with industrial 
assets, but rather in uniting of the vlast’ of nachal’niks with the opportunities of converting it into 
the material rents. The BAGs not just collude with some government executives from time to time 
on ad hoc basis, but incorporate them as their senior partners, or even have them as bosses26. 
BAGs provide alternative sources of rent for the nachal’niks, criminals, and other categories of 
post-soviet elites lacking direct access to the property. On the other hand, they provide control and 
coordination (including vertical integration) for the enterprises they unite. At the regional and local 
levels they can be encompassing. But an arbiter of such group meets the same problem of 
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coordination and control, and the larger the scale, the more internal instability and the higher cost of 
coordination. As a result, the BAGs tend to split up when they overgrow certain size.  
Notably, all major BAGs but one emerged at the Eastern Ukraine where accessible sources of rent 
are combined with discipline of proletarians and the Russia-like “mobilization culture”. Being more 
flexible and suited for the market competition than the directors were, the BAGs by the end of 
1990th have mostly (but not completely) crowded out or subordinated the directors, and became the 
main political-economic players. However, competition between BAGs rarely takes place at the 
open market: just as directors, they use to compete for rent using administrative levers.  
The most powerful nationwide BAGs appeared in the energy-intensive industries27.  
The domination of BAGs made the Ukrainian economy “insider-oriented” (World Bank, 2004). 
Such closeness obstructed the competitive selection and FDI. Meanwhile, it prevented the massive 
expansion of the Russian oligarchs. Also, the BAGs has consolidated the industries, restored the 
vertical integration, and arranged the enterprise restructuring. Still, they limit the internal 
competition, and have bounded capacity in improvement of management.   
No party or movement supporting the liberal democracy and market economy as such, without the 
nationalistic ideas (often opposing to these values) has ever got significant political influence28. In 
1991, Wyacheslav Chernovil, the Presidential candidate of Rukh (the national-democratic 
movement somewhat akin to the ones in the Baltic countries, but with vague economic program) has 
yielded only 13% of votes. Directors used to “settle the problems” at the level of executive, so they 
have established their own party only at the end of 1990th, when they have already mostly lost their 
influence. However, some of the most entrepreneurial and wise representatives of this group used 
their informal political influence and parliamentary votes for supporting the price liberalization and 
initial privatization.  
The lefts opposed to reforms under the slogan of “fighting oligarchy”. Ironically, since totalitarian 
control was already lost forever, this resistance de-facto helped the intermediate winners in 
preserving the reforms partial29. Although never could form a majority, the lefts in the unstructured 
Parliament took a position to bargain for political advantages in exchange for their votes. This 
allowed their representatives to head the Parliament during 6 years. But in this way they have lost 
the trust even of the protesting voters and remained supported mostly by dwindling nostalgic 
adolescents. The rest of major political parties are the political wings of certain BAGs, or “parties of 
power” composed of nachal’niks and their clients not necessarily sharing same ideology or political 
platform. They had neither clear ideological position, nor permanent electoral basis. Nevertheless, 
such parties had a majority or near majority in the Parliament since 1994 (see Tables 5-6).  
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Therefore, the second phase of reforms was procrastinated for three years, which led to disastrous 
overappropriation of rents resulted in deep economic decline and hyperinflation in the first half of 
1990th. 
5.1 Inflation  
At least initially, inflation was driven by the producers’ aspirations and markup pricing, which were 
later supported by the government with the monetary emission.  
Although by the end of 1991 the monetary overhang amounted for about two thirds of private 
consumption (Dabrowsky and Antczak, 1995), just for the first month of free prices, CPI increased 
almost twice as much (286,2%) without any substantial monetary emission. Such initial “jump” was 
evidently too high to be explained by the excessive demand only, giving that the deposits were 
frozen. We attribute it to massive breaking-up of coordination of the complementary monopolies 
(see Section 3) that led to sharp increase in price, fall in output, and general “disorganization” 
observed (but misinterpreted) by Blanchard and Kremer (1997)30. Sundakov et al., (1994) have 
found that many enterprises chose to maintain excess demand for their goods and see prices for their 
products rising – just as the monopolies do.  
For the year of 1992 the overall producers’ prices increase for the whole year (42.2 times) was twice 
as much as consumer prices’ increase (21.0 times)31. Such discrepancy might result from adjustment 
of the relative prices. However, at this time the energy prices remained negligible. Moreover, the 
magnitude of total initial distortion is estimated by Aslund (2002) as 40% for 1990. At the 
meantime, just during 1991 the consumer prices increased by 23%, while the producers’ ones – by 
55%, so this distortion should be mostly eliminated by the end of 1991. In fact, the producers 
(directors) have set markup prices. When increase in stocks compelled them to cease the production 
they appealed to the government with pseudo-Keynesian arguments demanding the monetary 
expansion to boost the “scarce demand” (Table 7). 
According to Vladimir Lanovoy, the market-oriented Minister of Economy of those times32, during 
the few months of 1992 the Ukrainian government resisted to the pressure of directors, but soon had 
to start the emission according to the law adopted by the Parliament. Of course, as long as the 
above-described “demand restrains” have nothing to do with the business cycle, this monetary 
expansion just stimulated large-scale rent seeking and further advanced price increase, because the 
complementary monopolies become engaged in devastating competition for shares in the total 
monopoly rents at the markets of final goods. Very soon they have seen their liquid assets devalued, 
and started pressing for credit emission. 
16-May-07 30
R.Kravchuk (1998) examined what where the roots for the 1992-1996 inflation, treating the growth 
of money supply as the intermediary cause. He showed that the main factor aggravating inflation in 
Ukraine at this time were the large quantities of cheap credit extended to the enterprise sector. As a 
result of industrial lobbying pressure, off-budget subsidies and directed credits to enterprises 
amounted to around 16% of GDP (Kravchuk, 1998: 14). According to research of Babanin (1994, 
after Kravchuk, 1998), credits to enterprises were the primary source of the 1992 to mid-1993 price 
surge. At the same time, Kravchuk (2003) still attributes the inflation to the necessity of funding the 
budget deficitii (Table 8). 
However, in 1992 the budget (consolidated, including the Pension Fund – hereinafter, by UEPLAC) 
deficit to be financed by NBU monetary emission was 6.3 mln UAH, but the credit to government 
increased for 17 mln. The money base meanwhile remained at the level of just 6 mln despite the 
negative interest rate. In 1993 the deficit was 85.1 mln., the credit increased by 96 mln. But the 
money base went up for 263 mln., three times higher than the budget deficit – which means that the 
emission mainly went not to the financing of the budget deficit (of course, huge and unsustainable), 
but to other purposes, mainly the soft crediting.  
Still, soft crediting could be driven by populism (here – the rent seeking by the broad groups of 
population), and thus cause the inflation through increase in consumers’ demand, as it was during 
the last Soviet years.  
However, the wages were strictly regulated, and their indexation was limited by the law at the level 
of 80% of the growth in CPI. Despite massive violations of the wage restrictions, during 1990-1993 
real wages has dropped by 44% approximately. At the meantime, despite obvious inefficiency, so 
called “breaking the business ties” with the rest of the former USSR, and the problems caused by 
inflation, the share of profitable enterprises exceeded 90% in 1992-93, while normally (for the 
whole forthcoming decade) it was about 50%. Despite severe depression, priority was given to 
upholding of the investments rather than consumption (Figure 4). 
Giving these facts, there is no surprise that wage restrictions did not prevent the acceleration of 
inflation. There was mostly paternalism toward enterprises, not a broad population, which drove 
inflation both through the financing of the budget deficit, and the direct “soft” crediting of the 
enterprises. It benefited the directors and some nachal’niks at the expense of the population.  
The five-digit inflation of 1992-94 was probably the most notorious episode of the history of 
economic reforms in Ukraine. The prices have increased more than a hundred times for a single year 
of 1993, which was a World’s record for this year among the countries not engaged in a war. The 
household deposits frozen at the State Savings Bank have almost33 vanished34. But Leonid Kuchma, 
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who as a Prime Minister in 1992-93 bears the responsibility for boosting of the massive dispensing 
of negative real interest rate credits to enterprises, has gained political support among the directors. 
5.2 Depression 
Just as inflation, the official GDP decline (almost 60% cumulatively) in Ukraine was the highest 
among the post-soviet countries not engaged in the wars. Its overwhelming part occurred in 1992-
95. In 1993 volumes of consumer goods retail trade reduced by almost 52% compared to 1990. 
Moreover, while in 1990 the retail trade was dominated by non-food products (about 56% of retail 
trade volumes), in 1993 non-food products constituted only 39%35. Eventually, this tendency was to 
the major extent conditioned by a reduction in households’ incomes. According to statistics, the 
average annual income in USD PPP reduced by 18.5%: from 6372 in 1990 to 5192 in 1993 (Figure 
5).  
Of course, the mechanical comparison to the Soviet GDP of 1990 is incorrect, since this base is 
measured in the gravely distorted non-market prices. Besides, the military production and the like 
components essentially contributed to the GDP of 1990. As well, the real purchasing power of the 
household incomes in 1990 was much lower than it appeared in the official statistics. Finally, large 
portion of GDP and incomes has just moved to the unofficial sector. Yet, even the alternative 
estimation provided by Aslund (2002) with accounting to these factors accounts the cumulative 
decline as 15%. This lower bound is still very high by any means. 
We see this drop not associated with the inflation only, since GDP decline started already in 1991 or 
even earlier, hence before any reforms occurred. And, of course, its in-deep and long-term cause, the 
gap of control, emerged and started widening a few decades before. We point out at least two other 
sources of decline stemming from our model. 
Breaking-up of the complementary monopolies that constituted the most of industrial sector. 
In-line with the Cournot’s theory, it led not only to one-shot price increase mentioned above, but 
also to respective reduction in output. The monetary expansion further aggravated this fall. 
Blanchard and Kremer (1997) associated this component of decline with “disorganization” caused 
by increased transaction costs, information asymmetry, and the like problems. Although such factors 
were in place too, in deed they were mostly alleviated by the web of blat networks that allowed not 
only for quick recovering of the most of production links, but also for successful organization of the 
very sophisticated multilateral non-monetary transactions. Notably, later on the restoring of 
production links in 1992-95 did not lead to recovery of output, as one should expect basing on the 
Blanchard’s and Kremer’s (1997) hypothesis; but so did the vertical re-integration within the BAGs 
after the crisis of 1998. 
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Massive embezzlement and “tunneling” of assets of state-owned enterprises caused by vague 
property rights. Although the directors have largely seized the residual control rights, their rights 
were illegitimate, thus too weak to prevent them from assets’ shedding. As the government 
committed to prevent disinvestment, the directors, being used to paternalism, relied on state 
intervention to cover the losses from asset’ shedding. Enterprises lacking owners’ control became 
common resources for the rent seekers. From the anecdotal evidence we know that the SOE were 
usually swarmed with intermediaries (mostly established by the directors, but also sometimes 
imposed by nachal’niks or criminals) that served for assets’ shedding. Perhaps, the most flagrant 
affaire was the one of the Black See Shipping Company (BLASCO) that has leased almost all of the 
Ukrainian ships for suspiciously low rents, and then lost practically all of them in favor of the 
suspicious firms.  
Besides, the directors appointed during the Soviet epoch were gravely inefficient managers 
(see Box 1) under the market conditions. But no effective and capable owner was in place to replace 
them with more appropriate persons. Being used to operate under the SBCs, they also rationally 
allocated more efforts for lobbying than for production. 
Privatization was necessary (though not always sufficient) condition for solving all of these 
problems. But the directors benefited from the asymmetry in property rights that allowed them 
converting the public losses to private benefits. They were also afraid of losing their control over the 
enterprises, and thus formal and informal power that they often valued higher than money – among 
all, because in many cases this power protected them from the criminal prosecution. The harshest 
foes of privatization were nachal’niks not incorporated into any BAG (particularly those 
representing the government bodies in charge of state-owned enterprises). Although already 
weakened by liberalization, their interests were pretty influential those times36 and successfully 
opposed (in the block with the lefts) to any legislative initiatives aimed at privatization. Finally, the 
BAGs those times were too weak to gain from privatization. 
The most entrepreneurial directors supported the insider-oriented privatization of some enterprises 
through leasing-buy-out scheme and successfully used it for taking over their enterprises officially. 
But the mass privatization was postponed for more than three years. 
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6. Emergence of an arbiter: Disinflation and 
Privatization 
6.1 Disinflation: initial attempts 
Ukrainian government did not try to combat inflation37 until the inevitable overappropriation of 
inflationary rent put the disinflation on the agenda in the late 1993 (Kravchuk, 2003). At the final 
stage inflation has devalued the enterprises’ liquid assets, so the directors eventually became 
interested in disinflation. But unlike the problem of lobbying for the monetary and credit emission, 
now all of them were receiving individual benefits from “soft” crediting; so the problem of 
collective action became much severer. Meanwhile, President Kravchuk as an arbiter was too weak. 
It looks like he tried to lean on the other groups, interested in disinflation, but mostly failed. 
Those times the BAGs became interested in expanding their control over the enterprises, hence, in 
the general weakening of directors. Unlike directors, the BAGs were flexible enough to shift to 
another sources of rents, keep their capitals in tax heavens, and so forth, which made them less 
vulnerable to disinflation. Therefore, in spirit of Tornell’s (1998) model of “reform from within”, 
they could support this reform. Moreover, using their links to authorities and criminals they took 
over the informal control over supply of gas and oil, thus became creditors interested in curbing the 
inflation.  
In July, 1993 President Kravchuk appointed the Acting prime-minister Yukhym Zvyagilsky 
representing the Donetsk BAG tied to coal mining that received tremendous open subsidies, so had 
an alternative source of rent. Moreover, inflation was rather subversive to this source since it 
reduced the real value of subsidies. On December 29, 1993 President Kravchuk created the 
commission on financial stabilization in Ukraine. 3 of 6 its members (Surkis, Medvedchuk, and 
Gubsky) belonged to the “Kyiv-seven” BAG. By February 20, 1994 this commission created the 
plan of financial stabilization through tightening of the monetary policy, with little attention to the 
institutional and structural reforms necessary for alleviation of the causes described above. 
However, questionable as it appears, this plan was never implemented in full.  
Some reduction of the inflation rate began in January 199438. As a result, the year of 1994 became 
the first one without any hyperinflationary episodes. But the state-owned enterprises responded to 
the lack of liquidity with ceasing the payments (non-payment) for the already supplied commodities 
and utilities. In particular, they did not pay for the energy resources (mostly imported), and this debt, 
according to the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian agreement, was taken over by the state. As a result, in 
the first quarter of 1994 the national income dropped by 36% year-to-year, and the industrial output 
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declined for 38,4%. Although in fact these figures partly reflect the decline actually occurred before 
but previously covered by inflation, the pressure for “supporting the domestic producers” with new 
credits arose. 
The BAGs as interest group appeared not coordinated enough, and anyway remained much weaker 
than directors. Thus, despite some political will supported by the coalition-building, inflation was 
just slightly reduced. Accomplishment of disinflation required a strong arbiter able to withstand the 
pressure of directors. For this reason President Kravchuk agreed to the preliminary elections in 
package with the Parliament elections. He felt strong enough, saw no potential rival, and hoped to 
be reelected with enhanced legitimacy. 
6.2 Appearance of an arbiter 
Quite unexpectedly, Kravchuk had miscalculated the influence of support that directors provided for 
Leonid Kuchma. In June 1994 the latter outstripped Kravchuk by 2% mostly due to the support of 
communists in the run-off. A main slogan of his campaign was: “Under Kuchma’s rule the factories 
will keep working”. He criticized the disinflation “at the expense of production” and favored the 
continuation of monetary emission partly restricted at that time. But following the logic of 
authoritarian (rent-maximizing) arbiter, he soon became an arbiter of the BAGs, and undertook the 
wide-scale reforms that allowed him to consolidate the rent-seeking sector: restore controllability of 
the most lucrative sources of rents at the expense of releasing of the rest of economy and exposing it 
to the market forces.   
L.Kuchma was personally more capable as an arbiter. He made a number of steps in order to 
strengthen his vlast’: 
• brought under the law enforcement agencies  
• conduced a campaign of fighting the organized crime, primarily racketeering, which served 
as informal arbiters for the business firms. Instead, the nachal’niks of respective level (often 
the police servants) took their place.  
• established the strong and powerful Presidential Administration;  
• has “restored the vertical of vlast’” – an arbiter-client hierarchy of regional and local State 
Administrations responsible to him unilaterally;  
• threatening the parliament with referendum, he abolished the outdated Constitution of 1977, 
replacing it by the "Constitutional Accord", which placed him in unilateral control over the 
government (1995). The present Ukrainian Constitution, adopted in the night of 27-28 June, 
1996 under the tough pressure of Kuchma had mostly reinforced these provisions39.   
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• has established the State Tax Administration (STA) as effective instrument of vlast’ 
essentially based on soft rule of law, in particular the SBC. 
It became a separate government body subordinated to him directly, and further augmented with 
tax police. Supplementary to the vast budget funding, the STA accumulated 30% of exhorted 
fines and penalties in off-budget fund assigned for bonuses to employees – which provided them 
with very specific kind of incentives. At the meantime, in-line with tradition of the soft rule of 
law, the tax rates were exorbitant for such a poor country40, and the legislation was punitive, 
contradictory, and often dubious. Furthermore, the STA was put in charge of development of tax 
legislation and endowed with a right to interpret the laws in the form of elucidative letters, often 
restricted for internal use only.  
• Finally, Pavlo Lazarenko, Kuchma’s compatriot and closest ally of those times, has nearly 
monopolized the gas and energy sector with his crony firm UESU41. 
In these ways L.Kuchma managed to became a really strong authoritarian arbiter. Although being 
elected under the anti-reform and populist slogans, he realized that undertaking of the urgent market 
reforms that could at least partly close the gap of control is the only way for him to survive as a 
leader of independent country. This was also in his own political and mercenary interests, as long as 
he was able to control the major sources of rents (as energy supply and natural monopolies). 
Those times the main sources of rent for the country ended: Russia has increased the prices for 
energy resources and threaten to cease the “soft” supply of these resources not paid back. Babanin, 
Dubrovskiy, and Ivashchenko (2002) argue that irresponsible borrowing, as a sort of “virtual” rent, 
became at least temporary substitute for the diminishing rent. Some media resources also plausibly 
suggested that Russia colluded with IMF in forcing the indebted post-Soviet countries to borrow 
from IMF and pay full price for the energy in-time. But to make the massive borrowing possible, 
Ukraine had to demonstrate its commitment to the market reforms.  
The directors, as intermediate winners, were inappropriate alias for this task. Soon after they have 
got rid of Communist party, and the centralized control and coordination, the most of directors 
disappointed in liberalization and became the major anti-reform force. Also, they were inconvenient 
as arbiters’ clients: their multiplicity and diversity incurred high cost of coordination. Thus, Kuchma 
had to rely on the BAGs. Initially, the Dnipropetrovs’k BAG and some particular oligarchs (like 
A.Volkov) hoped for his help in competition with the other ones in exchange to the support they 
provided during the election campaign. Their main rivals have even escaped from the country for a 
while after Kuchma’s victory. But according to the logic of an arbiter (Section 3), a rational ruler is 
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better of playing “divide-and-rule” than of being closely tied to a single player. Although Kuchma 
still favored some old cronies for a while, he has soon started rotating his favorites.  
His reformist policies have not expressed the voters’ will too. A.Paskhaver, a liberal advisor to 
Kuchma in his first tenure, was quite surprised when in a few weeks after the victory Kuchma called 
him up; and even more when he saw the basic points of the program that had nothing to do with the 
election pledges. Three months after, in October of 1994, Kuchma made a speech in the parliament 
on the strategy of economic reforms in Ukraine that included financial stabilization, mass 
privatization (declared but not pushed by his predecessor), and structural reforms, with a purpose of 
creation of a "socially oriented market economy". Moreover, he involved the IMF and the WB42 into 
active operations in support of reforms.  
In particular, the IMF has approved the program and provided Ukrainian government with STF 
(Systemic Transformation Facility) – an arrangement specially designed for countries in transition 
that lacked funds to finance the critical imports. The loan was conditioned by set of requirements 
that remained confidential. But most probably they included currency convertibility and reduction 
of the budget deficit. Also, ban for the financing of deficit through direct monetary emission is a 
standard condition of IMF.  
In the October 1994 decree on “setting prices in the conditions of market reforms” removed some 
remaining limits on the mark-ups on prices of consumer goods. Some observers characterized this 
move as a “shock therapy”, although it was still very far from the famous Polish example, and even 
Gaidar’s reforms in Russia. Still, V.Lisitsky testifies that a body promoting disinflation was the 
National Bank under V.Yushchenko. Being protected by the President, it gradually became less 
dependent on the government, and by late 1994-early 1995 could afford to refuse emission to the 
Cabinet. Ukraine received total $763 within the STF program in 1994-95 that essentially helped to 
calm down the inflationary expectations and finance the current account deficit. As a result, the 
inflation was brought down below 20%.  
6.3 Privatization  
Kuchma as an authoritarian arbiter was interested in personal control over just a handful of the most 
lucrative enterprises, mainly the monopolies; and enhancing of productivity of the rest of economy, 
in order to increase the common pool of rent for his main clients, the BAGs. To the extent he was 
accountable to the broad population he also got interested in preventing further economic decline 
that jeopardized to his power. But among the sources of decline only inflation was curbed, and this 
success was permanently endangered by paternalism towards the enterprises. Privatization was 
necessary (although still not sufficient) for restraining of paternalism, and closing the gap of control 
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at the micro level (see Section 5) that still caused economic decline, which constituted about 10% in 
1995 despite relatively modest inflation. According to this logic, the assets that an arbiter failed to 
control effectively should be privatized as soon as possible, and preferably to the benefit of BAGs. 
But the directors dominating in politics those times were not, as a rule, interested in mass 
privatization (Paskhaver). In addition to the general reasons described in Section 3, the most 
entrepreneurial and capable of them have already seized the opportunity of privatizing their 
enterprises using the leasing-buy-out scheme. The remaining were rightly afraid of any sort of 
market competition, and being disappointed in reforms even aspired returning to the central 
planning.  
Respectively, contrary to Stiglitz (1999) the process could not just move ahead on a “natural” 
decentralized basis, not mentioning the numerous shortcomings of such way. There was no 
alternative to the intervention of a strong arbiter able to divide one-shot rent from privatization 
between the real players. Just as in the case of disinflation, President Kravchuk was not strong 
enough to accomplish this task; but the President Kuchma was. He needed to stop overappropriation 
of rent stemming from state property, and increase the BAGs’ common pool of rent.  
BAGs, in they turn, were interested in the title property rights. They had got access to the rents from 
assets’ striping through control over the monopolized supply, primarily of energy and gas; and 
imposition (often in collusion with directors) of transfer pricing for outputs. But this so called 
“privatization of the cash flows” was too much vulnerable to political risks, while after disinflation 
some investment opportunities became lucrative comparing to the alternatives abroad. Some 
nachal’niks and their crony firms also gained a one-shot rent from buying the assets below their 
market price. Thus, unlike the most of other reforms, privatization was supported by the vested rent-
seeking interests. These interests augmented another driving forces by large, however shaped the 
whole process in a rent-seeking way. 
There were a few more factors that together have made the privatization true “locomotive of 
reforms” (Paskhaver, 1999).  
1. Contagion effect of Russia, where the mass privatization was already completed at this time. 
2. Support of the Russian government that was interested in making Ukraine more solvent as a 
debtor, and also hoped for the investment opportunities that privatization in Ukraine could 
provide for the Russian companies. 
3. Effective support by the IFOs, primarily the World Bank. In particular, they deserve large 
credit for explaining the straight causality between paternalism towards the enterprises and 
macroeconomic instability to the Ukrainian government. 
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According to the concept adopted in 1992, the mass privatization should immediately follow the 
price liberalization. But it was postponed by the Parliament vote – in our view, mostly because 
directors were not interested in it. Only the voluntary and privileged insider-oriented schemes 
(buy-out and leasing-buy-out) were successfully implemented those times. However, 
“ … unlike other countries, trade, consumer services and public catering sectors in Ukraine have not 
become the priority of [initial] privatization. Instead there has been a trend to privatize industrial 
giants, monopoly enterprises within the sectors that were planned to be “de-statized” at subsequent 
stages of privatization when necessary market environment and infrastructure were formed … more 
than 77% of the overall number of entities was privatized [during the years of 1992-94] through 
buy-out by the partnership of buyers established by the workmen collective or through the lease 
with buy-out” (Voronkova, 2000). 
Noteworthy, such course of events could be justified neither by any theoretical reasons, nor by the 
public’s attitudes (Tables 9, Figure 6). These schemes were restricted to the small enterprises in 
1994. However, even later on some sectors, as agricultural processing factories, and individual 
enterprises, as Illicha steel mill, were privatized to insiders by the special laws.  
The rest of initial privatization occurred through auctioning of very small entities in trade and 
catering.  
Privatization certificates were issued in the electronic form already in 1992, but those times could be 
used mostly by insiders. Effective certificate privatization started only in 1995, when cash 
certificates were issued with help and under the pressure of the WB. The Ukrainian certificate 
privatization was even more insider-oriented than the Russian one, due to the numerous privileges 
granted to insiders, first of all directors, and the option of making pretty large enterprises closed 
joint-stock ventures. Later on, it was accompanied with selling shares in large-scale enterprises to 
strategic investors under investment commitments. Both schemes were used until 2000 when cash 
privatization started. But special conditions stipulated for the formally open tenders often restricted 
them to one-buyer deals, as it happened in the notorious (but certainly not the worst) case of 
KrivorizhStal’ steel mill. Nonetheless the privatization was a few times interrupted with moratoria, 
and a number of enterprises were kept state-owned by the law, the most of entities went to the 
private sector by the end of 1997iii. Not surprising, they mostly appeared under control of directors, 
and to lesser extent – of the BAGs. The secondary market remained slack (unlike Russia), and the 
benefits of minority outside shareholders are insignificant. 
 
Box 2. Methods of privatization varied by the types of assets. 
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 Buy-out by 
insiders 
Leasing-
buy-out 
Cash sales 
(tender or 
auction) 
Privatization 
certificates 
Free transfer 
(distribution) 
to insiders 
house and 
apartment  
+    + 
small 
enterprise  
+ + +   
medium and 
large 
enterprise  
 + + +  
Of them 
“strategic” 
(very large, 
monopolies, 
ecologically 
dangerous, 
etc.)  
  +   
land      + 
Land plots +    + 
More detailed data on privatization of industrial enterprises are provided in Table 11. 
 
From the institutional viewpoint, privatization was a shift in the formal institutions, while the 
informal ones could not change so quickly. This means that its outcomes should roughly reflect the 
distribution of informal residual property rights existed at that moment; and only marginal shifts 
could be achieved. 
In particular, according to the intentions of authors of this reform (primarily, V.Lanovoy and 
A.Paskhaver) supported by the WB, a large portion of assets in the form of privatization certificates 
was disseminated among the population in exchange for its support. It also reflected the formal 
allocation of the title property rights, since the broad population, as title owner, controlled state-
owned assets via state apparatus that served as its agent.  
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But since in reality this control did not work, the peoples’ real rights of control were negligible. In 
fact, nomenklatura seized these rights from the very beginning of Soviet times (Ryvkina, 1998). For 
decades the people never intervened when nachal’niks and khosyaistvenniks, as arbiters and clients, 
competed for their actual shares in the property rights officially belonged to the people. So, when 
the title rights were adjusted to the actual ones they appeared distributed mainly between directors 
and BAGs in rough proportion to their influence, and in exchange to their support to the arbiter, 
while the people have got something roughly corresponding to their true political influence, and 
hence true residual property rights. Not surprising, the broad population came out disappointed 
(Table 11). Besides, privatization of the large enterprises that were the main victims of petty theft 
has partly broken a “tacit social pact” described above: while the rents for people became restricted, 
the ones for elites remained. 
Nachal’niks, although not officially endowed with any title property rights, still had vast stake in 
“state property”. It has also been reflected in the resulting allocation of residual property rights:  
They to large extent preserved their informal control over the enterprises through state paternalism, 
mostly in the form of SBCs.  
Picture 1. Formal and actual institutional changes in the process of mass privatization in Ukraine 
 
Thus, whatever unfair it looks, in fact the privatization in Ukraine has just revealed the existed 
institutional arrangement. From the perspective of social welfare and efficiency, it was a “second 
best” solution that, despite all its shortcomings, still has partly closed the gap of control. Since the 
privatized enterprises were not common resources any more, they become to lesser extent subject to 
asset tunneling and petty theft. Also, privatization restricted the paternalism toward the enterprises, 
“captured” by the directors 
and nachal’niks 
Still controlled 
by the directors 
and nachal’niks 
by the means of 
paternalism
Property rights
Time 
The title property rights
The residual rights of 
control
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and opened a way to its further curbing, though did not cease it completely. Equally important, it 
was a necessary (although not sufficient) precondition to the enterprise restructuring, and first of all 
changing in management: While before 1997 the average tenure of a director was more than 9 years 
(hence, the absolute majority were appointed already under the Soviet regime) (Pryor and 
Blackman, 1998), another data testify that after privatization 38% percents of the directors changed 
by 2002, of them 70% after 1997 (Akimova, 2004). Privatization has also opened a way for the 
consolidation of industries and vertical integration. Due to these reasons, the mass privatization 
appeared a point of return in the decline of the labor productivity (Figure 7).  
These reforms have strengthened the BAGs and ultimately established L.Kuchma as their arbiter. In 
this status, he could afford policies not necessarily immediately supported by the BAGs – yet not 
contradicting to their interests completely. On the other hand, as a former soviet khosyaistvennik he 
used to be subordinated to some paternalistic nachal’nik. Moreover, L.Kuchma appeared a common 
agent (Dixit, Grossman and Helpman, 1997) in respect to his international senior partners, like the 
leaders of Russia, USA, EU, and the IFOs, whom he treated as a sort of “nachal’niks”. As long as 
they behaved paternalistically, providing Ukraine with a sort of SBCs, Kuchma traded their support 
in exchange to some parts of sovereignty, and wherever possible cheated them in favor of the rent 
pool he controls (not necessarily his own rent) – just as a smart khosyaistvennik should. Until 2000 
this favorable position gave him plentiful political choice, and helped in maintaining the rent pool 
despite disastrous economic decline.  
The year of 1996 appeared the point of return in many other social and economic parameters, like 
innovation rate (Figure 8). But just as soon as the immediate threat of large-scale crisis was 
postponed, further systemic reforms, mainly reducing the paternalism towards the enterprises, were 
procrastinated again. When partly filled the gap of control, L.Kuchma  started using his power of an 
arbiter for suppressing the market competition through protectionism and monopolization 
(cartelization) of the markets – like establishing of privileged traders, state concerns, and so on. 
These activities are well documented in the media, and constantly associated with the large-scale 
rents. 
On the other hand, later on (in 1997-98) he agreed on essential deregulation of small and micro 
business, and later (in 1999) even released it from the discretionary power of the STA by 
introducing of the simplified taxation. This was done under the pressure of the SME lobby (a part of 
emerging civil society) augmented by the World Bank and other international organizations. Such 
reforms were in-line with the logic of an authoritarian arbiter, similar to the one revealed in 
privatization: the cost of control over this sector did not justify the potential rents it could bring to 
the arbiter; while its efficient functioning has generated the value that can indirectly increase this 
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rent. He was also interested in political support of the entrepreneurs. This was probably the one and 
only case when the market reform in Ukraine was driven by political-economic mechanism of the 
kind studied in mainstream literature. It has promoted the SME development (Figure 9). 
7. The second wave: reforms without interests 
7.1 “Virtual” stabilization and the role of IMF 
By the end of 1996 the most of enterprises were privatized and inflation decreased to 14%, so the 
main causes of the first crisis of overappropriation were eliminated. Still, the gap of control was 
deep, since paternalism towards the enterprises persisted. It led to pervasive rent seeking that largely 
reduced the productivity. As the public funds were the only ultimate source for this rent, they have 
been constantly overappropriated. So, an arbiter required a permanent inflow of rent to fill in the 
rent pool. This rent originated from abuse of trust of the creditors, augmented with paternalistic (in 
spirit of SBCs) treatment of Ukraine by the IMF and some bilateral creditors.  
Enterprises, especially the SOE, still enjoyed “soft” taxation: the notorious kartoteka-2 (see 
Dubrovskiy, 1999 for details) inherited from Soviet times widely allowed them bargaining for their 
tax liabilities, delays in tax payments, and favorable terms for paying back their tax arrears in-kind. 
In the similar way the enterprises effectively reduced their energy and utility bills, so the budget had 
to cover the difference (see Dubrovskiy, 2002, for details). While the official credit emission was 
restricted under the IMF’s scrutiny, enterprises widely leaned to “soft” forced crediting (Kornai, 
1996), because kartoteka-2 allowed them getting automatic “softly” limited tax credits. This made 
each enterprise a sort of independent, irresponsible and uncontrollable emission unit (Dubrovskiy, 
1999). Under these conditions, the macroeconomic stabilization was just an illusion (Szyrmer, 
2001).  
The official fiscal deficit constituted 6.7% in 1997, but the one calculated on the commitment basis 
reached nearly 11% of Ukrainian GDP, which was higher than in 1994 (Kovalev, 1999) and caused 
primarily by the paternalism towards the enterprises (Figure 10). While the emission financing of 
deficit and crediting of the government were restricted by IMF, wage and pension arrears along with 
irresponsible borrowing, were used as an alternative. T-bills floated at the rates well above 15% (in 
hard currency), which were characteristic rather to Ponzi scheme (Ivaschenko, 1999), became a sort 
of “virtual” source of rent for the government partly substituting the diminished rents from cheap 
energy (Babanin, Dubrovskiy, and Ivaschenko, 2002). The respective inflows offset highly negative 
current account balance and helped in supporting the fixed43 exchange rate regime, which created 
the illusion of stability. Although cheap IMF loans constituted a minor part of total crediting, they 
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served as signals to the rest of creditors by creating an illusion that the situation is under the IMF’s 
scrutiny. Thus, the position of IMF effectively facilitated procrastination of reforms (Banaian, 2003; 
Babanin, Dubrovskiy and Ivaschenko, 2002). 
While some of the IMF’s conditionsiv were well-targeted and played positive role44, the standard 
macroeconomic benchmarks set by the IMF failed to restrain the rent seeking.  
First, the IMF underestimated the political realities. In fact, it negotiated not with a politically 
responsible government, as it implied, but with an arbiter, former khosyaistvennik, that colluded 
with his clients in expanding of the pool of rent by cheating of the IMF’s – just as they used to do 
with any kind of nachal’nik before. For example, direct subsidies were merely substituted by 
indirect ones that constituted about a quarter of GDP (Lunina and Vincetz, 1999) (Table 11). 
Second, the IMF, by very its name, used to deal with the monetary transactions. However, in 
Ukraine (and even more in Russia) the blat networks were already well-established and widely used 
for barter transactions. Under the pressure of monetary constrains the enterprises shifted to non-
monetary transactions that constituted more than half of all official payments in the Ukrainian 
economy in 1998, and concentrated in the rent-seeking sector. Thus, monetary restrictions (Figure 
11), although necessary from the macroeconomic perspective, further stimulated the proliferation of 
barter45.  
Meanwhile, barter transactions were gravely inefficient, primarily due to their non-transparency and 
inherited closeness of exchange. In combination with state paternalism they allowed for survival of 
the loss-making enterprises, and made the transactions essentially interpersonal, thus the persons in 
charge – unchangeable. In this way this arrangement known as “virtual economy” (Ickes and Gaddy, 
1998) inhibited enterprise restructuring and first of all it’s most necessary component – 
improvement of management. Agriculture suffered especially hard from vague and asymmetric 
property rights on arable land. The government subsidies and credits were officially provided in-
kind, with tremendous abuses.  
The residual rights of control remained vague and asymmetric. As long as rent-seeking opportunities 
were in place, the new owners, primarily BAGs, were not interested neither in the universal 
protection of property rights (Sonin, 2002), nor in strengthening of the rule of law (Hoff and Stiglitz, 
2004). For these reasons, and contrary to initial expectations, the property rights did not 
automatically emerge with privatization (Sonin, 2002; Polishchuk and Savvateev, 2000). Moreover, 
the owners were still interested in trading of their property rights for the rents from paternalistic 
treatment. However, according to our model, unlike the situation of 1994, the arbiter was also 
reluctant to restrict the rent seeking, while he had his own stake in this rent and was able to maintain 
the pool of rent by other means. Substantial part of rent went to the directors in exchange for their 
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political support, while the rest was appropriated by the BAGs, with some part allegedly going 
directly to Kuchma, and certainly – to his son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk.  
Therefore, none of major political players were interested in further reforms. Those suffered from 
the rent seeking – the households and independent entrepreneurs – were not adequately represented, 
unable to arrange a collective action, and largely supporting the paternalism (see Table 12). Not 
surprisingly, early attempt of curbing the paternalism, undertaken already in the late 1996 by the 
vice-premier V.Pynzenyk, failed. In cooperation with international experts he prepared a legislative 
package (so-called "Package for Economic Growth") aimed on making the tax system more 
structured and coherent. In particular, these laws mostly eliminated the tax exempts, and abolished 
kartoteka. However, none of the bills aimed at strengthening the financial discipline was adopted. 
The new laws on VAT and corporate profit tax were finally adopted with hundreds of amendments 
maintaining and even enhancing the privileges. As a result, Ukraine obtained overly complicated, 
often ambiguous, and highly unstable tax legislation that was of little help in curbing the 
paternalism, instead providing the tax authorities with high discretionary power. 
According to the predictions of our model, a crisis was needed to make any real changes. And it 
came soon. 
7.2 Curbing the paternalism, and fiscal stabilization 
By the end of 1990th Ukraine faced a triple crisis of overappropriation. 
Creditors’ trust and Ponzi-like game with T-bills were exhaustible sources of rent subject to 
overappropriation. So was the IMF’s patience. Russia has defaulted on its T-bills, and giving to the 
low prices on energy could not afford the paternalistic treatment of Ukraine for a while. So, the new 
crisis of overappropriation occurred in September, 1998 ended the period of “incomplete stability”. 
It took the form of currency crisis, which, however, revealed mostly the fiscal problems, in turn 
caused by paternalism towards the enterprises46.  
As a result of this crisis the players started feeling limits of the pool of rents available for them. We 
argue that such clear and credible signal was the major change in the situation comparing to the 
previous period when this pool was perceived “soft”. Although Ukraine was lucky to avoid full-
fledge default, the threat of the one was just postponed. In the eve of Presidential elections of 1999 
the debt was restructured, but in 2000 Ukraine had to repay about 3 out of 13 billion dollars47, of 
them over one billion in the first quarter. Meanwhile the reserves were depleted, and no further roll-
over was possible.  
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At the same time, adverse developments caused by paternalism in agriculture and energy sector 
resulted in the crises of overappropriation in these vital sectors that could not be any more 
compensated with external supply.  
As a result of “institutional trap” described in Section 5, the energy sector became a common pool 
for energy-intensive industries. Partial privatization of the power-distributing companies only has 
created a literal common pool of payment for electricity. For a few years the most of Ukrainian 
population suffered from the ordered cut-offs unrelated to their payment discipline but needed to 
avoid the crash of energy system. But the BAGs in charge with energy supply that benefited from 
this system were among the main supporters of Kuchma.  
After the currency crisis the situation aggravated, because tariff rates, as well as the prices for main 
agricultural outputs, were frozen in Hryvnya while the costs of inputs increased with the 
depreciation of exchange rate. Along with the previously accumulated problems, it resulted in 
tremendous arrears (Figure 13), comparable to the total assets of the banking system, in the energy 
sector; and the worst harvest after the Second World War.  
In 1999 President Kuchma, despite his very low ratings, has won the re-election in a well-staged 
scenario "reformist President vs. orthodox Communist" (similar to what Yeltsin did in Russia in 
1996) (Table 13). His main possible right-wing rival, Wyacheslav Chornovil, has died a year before 
in the very suspicious car accident. During the elections Kuchma’s rhetoric was anti-reformist; he 
called for a major revision of reforms and increase in state intervention in the economy (Kravchuk, 
2003). He was successful in mobilizing the resources of all BAGs and neutralizing all non-left 
rivals.  
However, unlike the reforms of 1994-96, now the arbiter had to downsize the whole rent-seeking 
sector, including the part under his control, according to the diminishing amount of rent. Such 
reforms were expected to be highly “unpopular”, since all of the major political players should lose 
at least in a short run.   
Kuchma appointed his potential right-wing rival Victor Yushchenko as Prime-Minister, and 
distanced himself from the reforms subversive to the BAGs. For the first time of the presidency, 
Kuchma provided a Prime-Minister with certain freedom of decision-making and recruiting his 
team, even including the Kuchma’s enemy Yulia Timoshenko. According to V.Lysytsky, 
Yushchenko's team "did not [have to] ask for any permission to implement the reforms". 
Yushchenko had an image of pro-Western politician, and the necessary experience of 
communications with international institutions and foreign investors, which helped in solving the 
debt problem48. Kuchma has successfully pressed on the Parliament through his clients (remember 
that political parties, especially the newly appeared ones, were mostly the wings of BAGs) to make 
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it more compliant for the necessary reforms (Table 14). In the late-1999 and 2000 his Cabinet 
successfully conducted a series of reforms addressing all of the problems described above49. 
To restrain the paternalism towards the enterprises, Yushchenko committed that his government 
would not tolerate the mutual settlements and in-kind payments to the budget any more. Although 
he failed to sustain this commitment in full and had to adopt some settlements on previously 
accumulated arrears, this policy stopped the further accumulation of arrears (Figure 12). His Cabinet 
immediately abolished 800 of previous Cabinet’s resolutions granting the privileges to specific 
enterprises, and has withdrawn over 400 bills sent to parliament by his predecessors, including the 
2000 year budget. The new zero-deficit budget suspended the validity of several privileges. As a 
result, tax exemptions decreased for the first time (Figure 13). These changes were supported with 
reforms in the Cabinet procedures that largely complicated lobbyism and bargaining. 
Payment discipline in the energy sector was tightened by implementation of simple and strict rules 
of revenue sharing between the power-distributing companies and the common pool of generation; 
banning of non-monetary payments and eliminating of “soft” supply. Already in 2000, share of 
payments in cash (as opposite to in-kind, discounted, or delayed payments) rose to more than 90% 
(Figure 14).  
The arable land was finally privatized, although with restrictions, and ban on purchase and sale. 
Barter schemes of subsidizing and crediting of the agricultural enterprises were replaced with more 
transparent ones. The "collective agrarian enterprises" were abolished. In 2000 the prices for 
agricultural products were liberalized, so the price of wheat increased by three times, of livestock – 
by 2-3 times, which increased total peasants' income by about UAH 3 bln. Yet, the tremendous 
subsidies and vast tax exemptions for agriculture remained. 
These reforms have mostly closed the gap of control, so the year of 2000 became a turning point in 
many microeconomic trends (see Section 8). 
The most distorting forms of state paternalism, such as SBCs and non-monetary transactions were 
drastically reduced and concentrated in the relatively narrow sectors (Dubrovskiy and Shygayeva, 
2004). The new owners (most probably, the BAGs), took over many enterprises, changed their 
management or at least improved their structure of incentives (Akimova, 2004), and restored the 
vertical integration, which resulted in the output growth (as in oil-refining, metallurgy and ore, coal 
mining, and some other industries). Leap in the labor turnover rate (Figure 15) is evidences for 
massive enterprise restructuring. The share of respondents reporting that they are employed at the 
private companies doubled in two years, despite actual decrease in the share of such employees 
(Figure 16), which indirectly confirms strengthening of the property rights50. 
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Competition increased from 13% of enterprises reported to feel competitive pressure in 1999, to 
39% in 2002 (Akimova and Kuzyakiv, 2003). Even more important, the tendencies in competitive 
selection altered: instead of paternalism, investments became driven mostly by the market forces 
(Dubrovskiy, 2002, Dubrovskiy and Shygayeva, 2004).  
Respectively, the macroeconomic situation has dramatically improved. As a result, for the first time 
since 1990 the economy started to grow with the annual rates of 6-9%.  
Despite such bright results, and the outright signals from the Western countries, Kuchma allowed 
the communists and oligarchs to remove the reformers as soon as the threat of crisis was overcome. 
For the first time in the Ukraine’s history the Cabinet was ousted in the no-confidence vote. 
Interestingly, in-line with tradition of “soft” rule of law, the formal reason for this was the non-
obeying of populist legislation (adopted already in 1991-92) that was never obeyed in any budget 
for the whole history of Ukraine. But even when Yushchenko's Cabinet was ousted, the reforms 
were not reversed.  
Furthermore, increase in tax revenues, including those from the energy sector, allowed paying back 
the wage and pension arrears, and in this way making the reforms popular. Contrary to expectations 
based on the J-curve theory and other concepts developed in application to the welfare states, and 
despite such indeed unpopular measures as increase in the tariffs on communal utilities, food prices, 
and elimination of some privileges for the broad groups, the liberal reformer Yushchenko 
immediately became the most popular politician in the Ukrainian history with personal rating of 
around 30% that he maintained for the coming four years until he became a President in 2004.  
8. Social consequences of reforms 
During the late Soviet epoch, economic efficiency was rapidly decreasing, but the social outcomes 
were offset for a while by the inflows of rents. But such relative prosperity was unsustainable. 
Already in 1991 (before the reforms) the GDP started to decline, the inflation increased, and actual 
accessibility of goods dramatically fell. Breakdown of the USSR, dissolution of the COMECON, 
and ultimate failure of central planning, legalized by the formal liberalization, had further deepened 
the gap of control and aggravated the problems of coordination. This led to severe and rapid GDP 
decline described in Section 5 followed by respective deterioration in social standards. During 1991-
1992 the per capita household income decreased by 24%, so about 30% of Ukrainian population 
became poor in 1992. 
But the most of social indicators started improving since after the second wave of reforms. The ratio 
of incomes of the highest income quintile to the lowest income quintile increased from 3.6 in 199351 
to 4.8 in 1996 and than reduced to 2.8 in 200052. Infant mortality constituted 20 cases per 1000 live 
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birth in 1995, comparing to 18 in 1990, but has reduced to 17 in 2000. Tertiary enrollment (Figure 
17) and many other indicators reached their bottom values in 1995-96 and started improving soon 
the institutional and structural reforms, whatever inconsistent and ineffective, have partly closed the 
gap of control.  
Still, some important indicators have been stagnating, or even continued deteriorating, although in 
slower pace, between second and third waves of reforms (1996-99). Per capita GDP that has almost 
halved from 1992 to 1996 then almost stagnated until 1999, when it has started growing (Figure 5). 
In 1999, at the lowest point of the GDP decline, and soon after the currency crisis, the poverty 
reached its peak of alleged 45.7% of population having the daily incomes lower than $2, which is 
higher than in Egypt (43.9% in 2000) and twice as high as in Russia (23.8 in 2000) or Romania 
(20.5% in 2000), although still lower than in China (50.1% in 2000). The main part of this fall in 
occurred in the beginning of 1990th. In 1990 the average person consumed 3597 Kkal per day, in 
1999 – already 2505 Kkal53, which is very close to the physical minimum. In 1998-1999 the self-
assessment of social satisfaction reached its bottom value (Figure 18). 
Why the decline appeared so deep in Ukraine? We see the following reasons. 
1. Both factors complicating the arbiter’s control (complexity of production, and erosion in 
archaic public consciousness) were strong in Ukraine – unlike, for example, the Central 
Asian countries.  
2. Elites were weaker, and the general quality of governance worse, than in Russia and 
Belarus’. Centralized decision making left the regional elites with very limited 
responsibilities mostly boiled down to implementation of the decisions adopted in 
Moscow54. In Ukraine this problem was further aggravated by a sort of career “pipeline” to 
the most prestigious central Soviet government bodies that systematically deprived Ukraine 
from the most capable cadres promoted within blat networks attached to the USSR leaders 
originated from Ukraine (Khrushchev, then Brezhnev) (Babanin, Dubrovskiy, and 
Ivaschenko, 2002). Ukraine is also five times larger (in terms of population) than Belarus’, 
and far more diverse – both factors are usually associated with the lower quality of 
governance. 
3. Ukraine was the most industrialized republic of the USSR, so inherited the strongest first-
wave intermediate winners (directors) that procrastinated the second phase of reforms. 
4. At least during the first years of reforms the easy accessible sources of rent in Ukraine were 
as much distorting, as they were in Russia55. Just as in Russia they were related to export of 
cheap energy, immediately or in the form of energy-intensive commodities, like metals and 
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chemicals. But unlike Russia, the primary sources of these rents are abroad of Ukraine. The 
rent was soon ceased, so could not compensate for losses incurred by these distortions. 
Besides, the Ukrainian rent seekers have shorter time horizon, since their businesses in fact 
benefited from the Russian competitive advantages. 
Plausibly, in some other transition countries (like Georgia, Albania, Moldova, etc.) the gap of 
control, and respectively the decline, appeared even deeper, and was among the main reasons of 
civil conflicts. Ukraine managed to avoid such misfortune even despite the huge gap of control it 
suffered, and nonetheless sharp increase in inequality. In-line with our model we attribute this 
mostly to two main factors. 
Benefits from liberalization. Adjustment of the rent-seeking sector was spontaneous, due to the 
lack of control capacities rather than deliberate. But even such partial and inconsistent liberalization 
eliminated pervasive shortages and huge lines of Soviet times, dramatically increased the consumer 
choice, and provided lucrative job opportunities. Even more important, the government lacked 
control to enforce tax collection and other regulations. So, it in a way offered a tacit “social 
contract”, or rather a sort of “non-aggression pact”: “we” do not protest and allow “them” to gain 
their rents, while “they” do not intervene, and allow us to do the same. In Russia Gaidar and Yeltsyn 
have done it explicitly by the famous Decree on the Freedom of Trade (which, however, was soon 
reversed). In Ukraine, the people, as clients, were granted with some petty rent unofficially (mostly 
illegally, but not punished for a while) in exchange to social peace.  
Strengthening of property rights in the areas that nachal’niks failed to control anyway. The 
households benefited from privatization of housing and especially from allotment of land plots 
launched at the end of 1980th and continued till the mid-1990th56: In 1994 43.2% of respondents 
reported that they possess either an orchard or a garden plot, and in 1994-1996 revenues raised from 
agricultural products’ sales exceeded 30% of total households’ incomes. 
Note that only those methods of compensation not related to the state paternalism indeed worked – 
unlike official compensations, like wage indexation, social benefits, and privatization certificates. 
Because of inflation, and despite indexations, the real wages more than halved; all kinds of social 
benefits were devalued to a few dollars per month; and the black market value of privatization 
certificate amounted of less that ten dollars.  
People learned this lesson very well. The share of self-reliant individuals started increasing along 
with satisfaction with the social status (Figure 18). 
Inequality, although dramatically increased comparing to the extremely low values characteristic to 
Soviet times57, but still did not become too high. According to the estimations that can be made 
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based on available official statistics, the ratio of maximum to minimum wages at the inter-industrial 
level increased from 1.92 in 1985 to 4.69 in 1996 and then to 5.48 in 200158; which is higher that 
4.6 in Canada, 2.7 in the United Kingdom, and 1.4 in Norway59; but still less than 6 in Germany, 
and 6.7 in Russia. In 1999 the Gini coefficient in Ukraine constituted for almost 29, while in 
Morocco and Tunisia (2000) it was almost 40, in Egypt (2000) – 34.4, and in Bolivia – more than 
half as much (44.7).  
Although the second wave of reforms brought just partial success, the third wave of 2000-2001 has 
ultimately reversed the most of negative trends at least for several years. 
The official incomes and well-being of population became growing (Figure 5 also World Bank, 
2004) along with satisfaction with social status, which has by now (2004) reached the values 
characteristic to the normal social situation (in opposite to crisis). Thus, we can state that as a result 
of reforms, the deep crisis caused by decay of the Soviet system has been mostly overcome. 
Although formally the GDP per capita is still lower (in 2004) than it was in 1990, in reality giving to 
enormous fictitious component of the Soviet output and pervasive shortages, at least by the year of 
2003 we can state that real incomes of the population are not lesser than they were under the best 
Soviet times. But, unlike those times, they are growing in a more or less sustainable pace.  
Indirect measurements show that while some groups of goods decreased in their availability 
(primarily the foodstuff, books), others, primarily durables, increased (color TV sets, automobile, 
audio and video equipment) (Table 15)60. The availability of housing clearly improved: from about 
18 sq m of living space per person in 1990-1991 to 21 sq m in 200161. Besides, consumers enjoy 
plentiful choice; citizen enjoy civic rights and freedoms – although, still limited, but far more than 
under Soviets; and despite persistent problems the human development is in progress. Some other 
indicators also became already advanced of the Soviet times (Figures 7,8, and 17).  
Still, the living standards remain low, even comparing to Russia (which, however, enjoys vast 
natural rents). The property rights are still quite weak and susceptible; capital markets are still slack 
that prevents efficient allocation of the production assets. The people’s control over the state assets 
is still insignificant62, which leads to massive embezzlement.  
Unemployment was one of the few indicators that started deteriorating during the second wave of 
reforms (Figure 19). However, this was attributed mostly to shift from hidden unemployment to the 
open one; and also introducing of some unemployment benefits that were not in place at all before 
1994. It has been increasing until 1999, with no visible impact of privatization at least in the 
industrial sector (Figure 7). But, quite surprisingly, the paternalistic attitudes did not resulted in the 
marches of unemployed. Instead, people try to implement a number of innovative strategies.  
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If in 1994 8.2% and 1.9% of respondents reported to change their place of employment once and 
more than once, in 1998 their number increased, respectively, till 11.3% and 4.3%63. After the initial 
impulse given at the beginning of 1990th labor market mobility decreased slightly from almost 
25%64 till 18.8% in 1997 and then, following 1998 crisis, increased again till 28.8% in 200165. 
Industrial sector exhibited even higher mobility rates (23% in 1997-1998 and 34.6% in 2001), which 
could signal about the effective outsourcing of labor from state sector to the private service sector. 
The new sector, whatever weak, had mostly absorbed the excessive labor, so unemployment has 
never reached the extreme values, and became decreasing right after the third wave of reforms, 
when economic growth started. Also, by some estimation, 10-20% of Ukrainian labor is working 
abroad on a temporary or permanent basis. In 2003, 12.1% of respondents reported having personal 
or their family members’ experience of working abroad (of course, those working permanently were 
not surveyed). Therefore, what has clearly changed is the labor moral.  
Contrary to widespread laments, crisis did not significantly affect the long-term demographic trends 
(Figure 20). Moreover, after the second wave of reforms the long-term upward trend in the mortality 
rate was reversed.  
Therefore, apparently the reforms appeared the right remedy from economic crisis. Nevertheless, 
they remain mostly unpopular. 
Initially the population mostly supported the reforms. However, at this time the nomenklatura was 
not ready for these reforms. At the time the reforms were finally undertaken, they have mostly lost 
the public’s support. Even in 1996 the respondents pointed out the “strengthening of discipline66”, 
and “fair remuneration” (in a sense of “equal compensation for the same work”) as the major 
components of market reforms. Meanwhile the development of banking and market infrastructure, 
and bankruptcies of the loss-making firms, are listed the rest. About 40% responded that they are not 
at all familiar with the basic principles of a market economy. Noteworthy, some of these attitudes 
have further aggravated in 2000 (Table 12). 
The people (most often, rightly) perceived state officials and politicians as totally corrupted or 
persuading their own agenda (e.g. vlast’-maximizing); and the business as totally rent seeking. Such 
views were fortified with disappointment in reforms that allegedly have made the things worse. 
Thus, people considered both the state and business unworthy of their support, and call the ruling 
elites “mafia” (Table 16).  
We attribute these attitudes to reforms to the remaining ambiguity of public consciousness (Table 
17). But, notably, those who are familiar with principles of market economy, as well as the younger, 
wealthier, and having the experience abroad, have much more positive attitude to entrepreneurship 
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than average (Table 18). This brings a hope that learning, especially the learning-by-doing, will 
eventually alter the anti-reformist inclinations.  
Therefore, the social costs of crisis were huge. But they should not be associated with the reforms, 
as it is usually done. Since the crash of the Soviet system was inevitable, reforms were not the 
primary cause of these loses. The opposite, we did not find evidences of the social costs incurred by 
the third wave of reforms. The second wave also had clearly positive impact on the most of social 
indicators (at worst, their deterioration has slowed down), while only the evidences on 
unemployment remain ambiguous. Only the passive “reforms” of the first wave (first phase, 
according to the definition given in Section 3) were followed by immediate deterioration of social 
standards. But we emphasize that these “reforms” were just a corollary of the long-term process of 
decay.  
Probably, if there would be a possibility to make the inevitable crash of Communism less 
destructive and less procrastinated; and then the necessary second-phase reforms more resolute, 
better planned, and generally more consistent and comprehensive, then they perhaps could bring the 
better results with lower costs – but, unfortunately, this is mostly wishful thinking. As the first 
Ukrainian President Leonid M. Kravchuk use to say: “We have got just what we have got”. 
9. Conclusions  
Therefore, the main lessons concerning reforms in a rent-seeking society that one can derive from 
the Ukrainian experience look as follows: 
• A rent-seeking society can hardly be truly democratic, even despite the formal institutes. The 
necessity of preventing the overappropriation and rationing the rent begets an authoritarian 
(or even totalitarian) ruler even despite the formally democratic polity. In turn, the 
dictatorship most often, but not necessarily, brings the rent seeking. Thus, curbing the rent 
seeking can indirectly promote the democratic developments, but not necessarily vice versa.  
• Despite the lack of democracy, economic reforms can do occur without a clear public 
mandate or the interest group pressure. They can be driven by the interplay of rent-seeking 
interests that occurs under the threat of a crisis, or when such crisis comes. So, in a rent-
seeking society, diminishing of rent eventually promotes the reforms that lead to expansion 
of the competitive market sector, strengthening of the property rights and the rule of law, and 
indirectly facilitates democratization.  
• Deterioration of the authoritarian control and coordination caused by erosion of the 
patrimonial norms and/or totalitarian ideology, and the technological progress; as well as 
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decrease in rent caused by the overappropriation (in turn, resulted from the ill control and 
coordination), or external factors can beget the driving forces for reforms in a predominantly 
rent-seeking society.  
• Abandoning of control can be excessively costly if it occurs too early, when the people are 
not ready to replace it with the property rights and market coordination. On the other hand, 
social costs of changes are determined mostly by deepness and longitude of erosion in the 
direct control and coordination, which precedes the reforms. The longer procrastination of 
reforms, the higher costs, and impediments to the establishment of market institutions. The 
faster the market institutions take place of the weakening direct control and coordination, the 
lower social costs. Thus, (1) the delayed, slow and inconsistent reforms are more costly; (2) 
the availability of rent can ultimately increase the social cost of reforms instead of mitigating 
them, unless this rent goes directly to the broad population. 
• Democratic changes not backed with abandoning of the “zero-sum” perception and 
paternalistic consciousness does not immediately lead to the result. However, weakening of 
the authoritarian control can start the chain reaction of reforms that can ultimately lead to 
establishing of a market democracy. 
• There are some ways to help the reformers and alleviate the severity of reforms. External 
factors (like foreign aid) facilitate the reforms when and where they help strengthening the 
property rights and competition, and restraining the rent seeking. The main efforts should be 
put on (a) resuming or preserving of control over the natural sources of rents, and the public 
funds – hence, the resources that should be under control anyway (ct. “discipline to the old 
sector” by World Bank, 2002); (b) facilitation of establishing of the property rights (through 
altering of the public’s perceptions, especially the one of a “zero-sum”; and restriction of the 
rent seeking opportunities); (c) encouraging of the sector based on the property rights and 
market coordination (World Bank, 2002).  
• At the same time, the facilitators can do harm by providing the authorities with sources of 
rents that can be used as a substitute to reforms. One should strongly avoid the paternalistic 
treatment of allegedly reformist governments, especially if it is conditioned by 
macroeconomic benchmarks only. In particular, the credits for “financing of the budget 
deficit” can help delaying the reforms, and in this way eventually increase their social cost. 
Aid, if provided, should be channeled directly to the population under the tight control of 
international organizations. 
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• Macroeconomic constrains, like the IMF standard benchmarks, are important, but far from 
sufficient tools for shaping and facilitating of systemic reforms. Privatization of the assets, 
especially those that the state cannot control effectively, is vitally important, but also 
insufficient, especially if not accompanied with the reduction in state paternalism towards 
the enterprises.  
• Unlike the welfare state, the reforms most urgently needed in a rent-seeking society are often 
popular, since they include mostly restraining of the rent seeking of oligarchs, and can 
immediately improve the well-being of the broad social groups.  
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9.1 Appendix 
 
Table 1: The relative force of different components of "party of power" at the initial stages of 
independence is represented in the composition of the Communist majority of the 1990-1994 
parliament: 
Communist majority in Rada of 1990 (381 members of parliament) 
Social status  Number of members of 
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parliament 
Heads of the units of "people's economy" (from directors of plants 
to ministers) 
97 
Party leaders (from the head of kolkhoz’s partcom to Central 
Committee) 
85 
Heads of executive committees, heads of departments of executive 
committees 
48 
Heads of kolkhozes  35 
Scientists, heads of educational institutions 31 
Workers 17 
Military commanders  16 
Teachers 4 
Others 48 
Source: Haran’ O. and O.Mayboroda. The Ukrainian Lefts: Between Leninism and Social-
Democracy. Kyiv, 2000  
 
Figure 1. Evolution of Ukrainian industrial mix in 1990-98. 
The development of Ukraine's industrial mix (as % of industrial output in world 
prices - by UEPLAC)
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Source: UEPLAC, authors’ calculation 
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Table 2. The hierarchy of values of population of Ukraine in 1981 (according to the data of the 
public opinion poll, representative for population of Ukrainian SSR, conducted by Institute of 
Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Ukrainian SSR, N=5000), % 
 
Values  Age of 30 years and less 30 years and more 
Material well-being 34.7 32.3 
Work labour  29.1 22.4 
Family 27.7 21.5 
Peace between nations 16.2 22.9 
Dwelling 13.8 8.2 
Health 12.5 20.5 
Communication with people  10.2 4.5 
Political, ideological and 
moral values 
4.7 4.2 
Rest, entertainment  4.5 6.9 
 
 
Тable 3. The characteristics of different types of economy made by population of Ukraine in 
November, 1991 % 
 
Characteristics of 
economy 
It is characteristic for 
capitalist economy  
It is characteristic for 
socialist economy  
Freedom 66.1 36.7 
Inequality 72.4 62.1 
Technological advance 86.1 39.8 
Wealth 85.0 29.6 
Selfishness 63.3 59.0 
Profitability 85.8 43.1 
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Fairness 38.8 28.1 
Shortage 15.0 77.9 
Humanism 41.7 37.4 
Progress 80.9 36.0 
Oppression 55.2 46.7 
Corruption 66.8 71.0 
Efficiency 77.2 29.3 
 
Table 4. Price control in 1992-1993 
 
Beginning of 1992 Mid-1993 Type of prices 
Share in total 
wholesale 
turnover 
Share in retail 
turnover 
Share in total 
wholesale 
turnover 
Share in retail 
turnover 
Administered 
prices 
17% 12% 11% 10-12% 
Regulated prices 57% 67% 30-40% 30-40% 
„Free” prices 26% 21% 50-60% 48-60% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Dabrowski (1994: 7, 9) after IMF (1993: 18) and Swiecicki and Wellisz (1993) 
 
 
Table 5. Ukrainian parliament and president elections results. 
 
 
Structure of Ukrainian Parliament (1994-1998); First-Past-the-Post electoral system  
Party or Group Representation Number of Seats 
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Communist party Party of "dissatisfied" orthodox Communists 96 
Constitutional 
center  
People's Democratic Party of Ukraine; many members hold 
posts in contemporary executive power 
56 
Socialist party Former middle-rank technocracy communists; possible future 
"Euroleft" party 
36 
Reforms Intellectuals, pro-reform economists 31 
Agrarian Agrarian Party of Ukraine 27 
Yednist` ("Unity") Dnipropetrovsk-based industrial directorate 27 
Independent  "New Ukrainian" economists and businessmen 25 
Rukh  People's Movement of Ukraine party, first opposition 
movement, now center- right 
25 
Social market 
choice  
Donetsk-based businessmen and industrial directorate 25 
Interregional 
group  
 Directors and some liberal politicians from Russified regions 23 
Other Failed to find cleavages appropriate for themselves and/or 
small parties 
43 
TOTAL Due to the complicated conditions and low turnout, some 
seats were not filled 
423 of 450 
 
Table 6. Structure of Ukrainian Parliament (1998-2002) – after the elections;  
 
Mixed electoral system (50%/50%; 4% threshold for parties) 
Party or Group Representation Number of 
Seats 
Communist party orthodox Communists 123 
Independent   businessmen (mainly first-past-the-post constituencies) 97 
Rukh  national-democratic 46 
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Socialist 
party+Peasants' 
party 
Former middle-rank technocracy communists; Socialists-
possible future "Euroleft" party; "Peasants" - the lobby of 
former collective farms' heads 
35 
People's 
Democratic Party  
“party of power” (many members of the party hold posts in 
contemporary executive power) 
30 
Hromada 
("Community") 
Political wing of the BAG of United Energy System 
(Dnipropetrovsk) associated with former Premier 
P.Lazarenko 
25 
The Green party Conglomerate party that used the slogans of the Green 
movement and financial resources of industrial business and 
commercial banks 
19 
Progressive 
Socialist Party of 
Ukraine 
Former "radical-orthodox" wing of Socialist party; now 
populist ultra-left party 
17 
Social-Democratic 
Party of Ukraine 
(united) 
political wing of Surkis-Medvedchuk (“Kyiv-seven”) BAG 17 
Agrarian party of 
Ukraine 
Agrarian lobby's party, affiliated with the executive power 9 
"Forward, 
Ukraine!" 
Intellectuals,pro-reform economists (electoral bloc; former 
group "Reforms") 
4 
National Front Bloc of right nationalist parties 3 
Other Failed to find cleavages appropriate for themselves and/or 
small parties 
25 
TOTAL The turnout threshold of 50% of the electorate was abolished 450 
 
Table 7.  Consumer price inflation, monthly changes, 1992-1996 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
January 252.4 73.2 19.2 21.2 9.4 
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February 15.3 28.8 12.6 18.1 7.4 
March 12.1 22.1 5.7 11.4 3.0 
April 7.6 23.6 6.0 5.8 2.4 
May 14.4 27.6 5.2 4.6 0.7 
June 26.5 71.7 3.9 4.8 0.1 
July 22.1 37.6 2.1 5.2 0.2 
August 8.3 21.7 2.6 4.6 5.7 
September 10.6 80.3 7.3 14.2 2.0 
October 12.4 66.1 22.6 9.1 1.5 
November 22.0 45.3 72.3 6.2 1.2 
December 35.1 90.8 28.4 4.6 0.9 
End-year inflation 1821.7 10155.0 401.1 181.7 39.9 
Source: IFS IMF and Dabrowski (1994: 22; data for January 1992) 
 
Table 8.  Financing of the consolidated budget deficits, in percent of GDP, 1992-1996 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Budget balance -12.2 -6.5 -10.5 -8.0 -4.5 
General govt. balance -21.4 -14.0 -13.4 -10.8 -5.2 
 Budget deficit financing: 
NBU and bank credits 6.4 8.2 12.2 5.4 1.7 
Goverment bonds sales (net) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4 2.0 
Other internal debt 0 0 0.2 0 0 
Foreign financing 0 0 1.0 1.6 1.5 
Errors and omissions 15 5.8 0 3.4 0 
Source: Kravchuk (1998: 13) 
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Figure 2. Structure of consolidated budget by years 
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Source: State treasury of Ukraine, own estimates 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Actual execution of the consolidated budget 
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Figure 4. The real GDP decline and the share of investments in GDP. 
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Figure 5. Evolution of the GDP per capita (in constant 2000 PPP US dollars) 
16-May-07 68
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
Source: World Bank (through www.gdnet.org) 
 
Table 9 
People’s attitude towards the privatization of small enterprises (%) 
 
How do you regard the 
privatization of small 
enterprises?  
1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Rather negatively  13.6 18.3 19.0 19.3 22.0 20.9 22.9 18.7 
Difficult to say  28.8 24.4 25.1 27.2 27.5 24.9 27.2 28.6 
Rather positively  56.2 54.8 55.4 53.4 50.4 53.7 49.2 52.0 
Not answered 1.4 2.5 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.8 
 
Figure 6. People’s attitude towards the privatization of large enterprises (%) 
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Table 10. Methods of Privatization by Industries of Ukraine as of January 1, 2000 
 
Number of 
privatized 
entities 
Privatized by method 
non-competitive competitive 
buyout lease with 
buyout 
auction, 
competition 
sale of 
shares 
Industry, branch 
Total Share 
of the 
overal
l 
numb
er 
num
ber 
of 
entiti
es 
share 
withi
n the 
indust
ry, % 
num
ber 
of 
entiti
es 
share 
withi
n the 
indust
ry, % 
num
ber 
of 
entiti
es 
share 
withi
n the 
indust
ry, % 
num
ber 
of 
entiti
es 
share 
withi
n the 
indust
ry, % 
Ukraine — total 6670
7 
100.
0 
2848
7 
42.7 1316
2 
19.7 1494
7 
22.4 1011
1 
15.2 
Industry 6974 10.5 934 13.4 1331 19.1 472 6>8 4237 60.8 
Transport 1346 2.0 118 8.8 154 11.4 73 5.4 1001 74.4 
Construction 3293 4.9 706 21.7 868 26.7 272 8.4 1447 44.6 
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Trade and public 
catering 
2991
7 
44.8 1413
0 
47.2 7571 25.3 7785 26.0 431 1.4 
Housing and municipal 
economy 
3137 4.7 1499 47.8 644 20.5 891 28.4 103 3.3 
Consumer services 1185
9 
17.8 6742 56.9 2079 17.5 2915 24.6 123 1.0 
Unfinished construction 1597 2.4 212 13.3 12 0.8 1366 85.5 7 0.4 
Agriculture 3072 4.6 1656 53.9 48 1.6 45 1.5 1323 43.1 
Other industries 5512 8.4 2490 45.2 455 8.3 1128 20.5 1439 26.1 
Source: Voronkova, 2000 
 
Figure 7. Labor productivity and employment in the industrial sector of Ukraine for 1991-2003 
(before and after mass privatization) 
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Source: DerzhComStat 
 
Figure 1. The number of new articles of production commercialized during a year 
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Figure 9. The number of small businesses in Ukraine in 1991-2000, thousands of entities* 
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*Source: State Committee of Statistics. Before 1996 – “small enterprises” + ”cooperatives”, 
author’s calculations. 
Figure 10. The budget deficit appeared due to paternalism towards the enterprises. 
 
16-May-07 72
Budget deficit and potential budget resources (% of GDP)
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1997
1998
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Consolidated budget deficit 
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different kinds of arrears to
the consolidated budget
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budget and extra budgetary
funds 
Tax privileges, free economic
zones and territories with a
special investment climate
 
Source: State tax administration of Ukraine, State Treasury of Ukraine, own estimates 
 
 
Table 11. Subsidy estimates (% of GDP) 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Explicit (direct) subsidies 7.5 5.6 7.0 5.6 4.8 3.8 3.7
Industry and energy  5.1 3.2 4.2 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2
Construction 0.8 1.1 0.7 1.6 1.2 0.6 0.7
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1.4 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5
Transport and communication 0.1 0.0 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.1 0.9
Other services related to economic 
activity 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
Implicit subsidies 0.8 0.7 20.1 21.4 24.1 20.6 21.2
Tax privileges, free economic zones and 
territories with a special investment 
climate 0.0 0.0 12.7 17.3 19.0 17.7 16.2
Total net increase in overdue arrears to 
the consolidated budget and extra 
budgetary funds  0.8 0.7 1.6 3.8 4.3 -0.4
-
0.02
Write-offs or restructuring of different 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.3 0.8 3.3 5.0
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kinds of arrears to the consolidated 
budget 
 
Source: State tax administration, State treasury of Ukraine, own estimates 
 
Figure 11 
Growth of monetary base and inflation, 1996-1999 
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Source: own calculations based on NBU data 
 
Table 12. Understanding of the contents of economic reforms by population of Ukraine, % 
 
Judgments about the contents of reforms* The percent of those people 
who agree that this 
judgment reflects the 
contents of economic 
reforms  
 1996 2000 
Rise in living standards of majority of population 53.0 65.4 
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Strengthening of discipline at enterprises of all 
patterns of ownership 
35.7 28.1 
Implementation of principles of fairness for 
remuneration of labor: equal remuneration for equal 
work  
30.9 38.2 
Reform of tax structure 21.8 29.4 
Wide-ranging privatization (of enterprises, land, 
dwelling houses, etc.) 
14.6 7.8 
Maximum development of competition at the markets 
for commodities and labor 
11.6 11.5 
Increase of state assistance to those enterprises for 
which it is hard to survive in new conditions  
10.0 26.2 
Development of banking system  5.5 4.0 
Development of market infrastructure (of stock 
exchanges, investment funds, etc.)  
5.5 4.6 
Bankruptcy of unprofitable business 4.5 3.4 
I don't know 16.3 10.8 
 *It was possible to choose not more than three judgments 
 
Table 23. 1999 Presidential elections 
 
Main candidates Party affiliation  Percentage of votes 
won (election) 
 Percentage of 
votes won 
(runoff) 
Center and Center- 
Right 
   
Leonid Kuchma Non affiliated 36.49 56.25 
Yevhen Marchuk N/a 8.13 - 
Left    
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Petro Symonenko Communist Party of 
Ukraine 
22.24 37.80 
Oleksandr Moroz Socialist Party of 
Ukraine 
11.29 - 
Natalia Vitrenko Progressive Socialist 
Party of Ukraine 
10.97 - 
 
Table 14 
Evolution of the Parliament elected in 1998. 
 
 
Factions 
 
 Percentage 
of votes won 
(29/03/1998) 
Number of 
deputies 
(as of 
12/05/1998) 
Number of 
deputies  
(as of 
31/10/2000) To 
be academically 
correct here we 
should include 
figures of the 
end of 2001  
Left    
Communist Party of Ukraine 24.68 123 114 
“Left Center” (Socialist Party of 
Ukraine)  
8.56 35 16 
Progressive Socialist Party of 
Ukraine 
4.05 17 - 
Center    
“Hromada”/in 1999, after 
Lazarenko's escape, replaced by 
Yu.Tymoshenko's “Fatherland” 
4.68 39 31 
“Solidarity” - - 28 
16-May-07 76
 “Apple”  - - 15 
“Labor Ukraine” 3.06 - 48 
Social-Democratic Party of 
Ukraine (United) 
4.01 25 34 
Green Party of Ukraine 5.44 24 17 
“Renaissance of the Regions” - - 37 
People’s Democratic Party 
(NDP) 
5.01 89 20 
Center-Right (National 
Democrats) 
   
Ukrainian People’s Movement 
(“Rukh” led by Yurij 
Kostenko)* 
- - 21 
People’s Movement of Ukraine 
(“Rukh” led by Hennadij 
Udovenko)* 
9.40 47 19 
“Reforms-Congress” 3.13 - 15 
Non-aligned  49 34 
Total  448 449 
* In spring 1999, main national-democratic force "Rukh" split up in two. 
 
Figure 12. Tax arrears in Ukraine before and after the crisis of 1998. 
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Source: World Bank, 2004 
 
Figure 13. Evolution of tax privileges during the second wave of reforms2 
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Source: State tax administration of Ukraine, own estimates 
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Figure 34. Level of payments for electrical energy (average on 18 energy distributing companies 
among 31), 1999-2001 
R2 = 0.94
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
11
.1
99
9
12
.1
99
9
1.
20
00 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11
.2
00
0
N
/R
1.
20
01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9.
20
01
The share of sales 
actually paid in cash
 
Source: Dubrovskiy, 2002 (based on the State Committee of Statistics data). 
 
Figure 15. Annual rates of quits and hires in the Ukrainian industrial sector. Source: UEPLAC. Bold 
lines are trends (with a correction for seasonality). 
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Source: DerzhComStat, author’s estimations. First published: World Bank, 2004 
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Figure 16. The number of respondents reported that are employees in the private sector (by survey 
of the Institute of Sociology) in comparison with their actual percentage (by the national statistics). 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
% of entities privatized by the moment in the total number of
privatized entities
ACTUAL percentage of the total labor force working at the private
sector
PERCEIVED working in the private sector (IS NAS survey)
 
Source: DerzhComStat, Panina (2005), author’s estimates 
 
Figure 17. The number of students studying in Ukraine (thousand persons). Source: Ministry of 
education and science of Ukraine 
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Source: Ministry of education and science of Ukraine. Quoted by: World Bank, 2005. 
 
Figure 18. Evolution of satisfaction with own social status (in the score of maximum 5, right axis), 
and self-reliance (in the percentage of respondents agreed that their success depends on themselves 
net of the percentage of respondents agreed that it is determined mostly by the external conditions – 
left axis). 
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Source: Panina, 2005, author’s estimations 
 
Table 15. The changes of material well-being of a family in Ukraine (according to the data of the 
public opinion poll in 1981 and 2003), % 
 
 
What does your family have 
among the above mentioned? 
 
 
1981 г., N=5000 2003 г. , N=1800 
Summer cottage, garden-plot  12.9 33.5 
Automobile 9.8 18.9 
Colour TV-set  12.9 79.7 
Fashionable clothes 19.1 10.5 
Library (>100 books)  8.7 23.4 
Refrigerator 64.2  90.9 
Washing-machine  61.0 70.4 
Sewing-machine 46.0 46.1 
Stereo- and video equipment 10.2 19.8 
Tape recorder, record-player, 
radio set  
53.6 56.1 
Sport, tourist's, 
hunting, fishing 
 equipment  
18.4 15.1 
Cold water  57.8 78.3 
Hot water  24.0 41.8 
Central heating  33.5 62.3 
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Figure 19. Evolution of unemployment in Ukraine 
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Source: Laborsta (ILO) 
 
Figure 20. Demographic trends in Ukraine 
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Source: DerzhComStat 
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Table 3. The distribution of answers of Ukrainian population to the question «What social groups 
are very important in the life of Ukrainian society?» in the public opinion poll of Institute of 
Sociology of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 1995 and 2003, % 
 
 1994 г., N=1800 2003 г., N=1800 
Mafia, criminals 33.9 42.7 
State bureaucracy, «officials» 29.1 24.5 
Entrepreneurs 24.2 28.9 
Workers 23.4 19.1 
Farmers 20.9 14.7 
Intellectuals 16.3 9.8 
Managers of state enterprises 16.2 11.9 
Managers of agricultural 
enterprises 
10.7 5.7 
Police and security service 
workers 
7.9 11.7 
Military men 6.6 5.6 
Pensioners 1.9 2.9 
Other 0.7 0.7 
Nobody 4.2 3.1 
It is difficult to say 17.4 15.4 
 
 
 
Table 17. The distribution of answers of Ukrainian population to the question «Now political forces 
are divided into those who would like socialism to come back, and those who want to build 
capitalism. What is your own attitude to these forces?» in the public opinion poll of Institute of 
Sociology of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 1994 and 2003, % 
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Variants of answers 1994 2003 
I support socialists 22.1 25.7  
I support adherents of capitalism 12.7 10.6 
I support both these and those, if only they don't clash 23.7 23.4 
I don't support any of them 20.0 22.3 
Other 1.8 1.7 
It is difficult to say 19.3 16.1 
Did not answer 0.4 0.2 
 
Table 18. The factors of attitude to entrepreneurship, % 
 
Factors of attitude to entrepreneurship Attitude to entrepreneurship 
  Positive  Undetermin
ed  
Negative 
Possession of information on the main 
principles of market economy 
   
Well-informed 85.5 9.4 5.1 
Poorly informed 60.7 24.4 14.9 
Not informed 37.4 31.7 30.9 
Age    
30 years and less 74.6 17.4 7..9 
30-54 61.2 24.7 14.2 
55 years and more 32.5 32.0 35.5 
Education    
Primary and incomplete secondary 38.8 29.8 31.4 
Secondary 64.0   
specialized secondary 62.5 24.5 13.0 
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Incomplete higher and higher 73.5 20.5 6.0 
Type of settlement    
Kiev 65.0 30.0 5.0 
Other city/town 58.8 23.6 17.5 
Village 48.9 25.1 19.1 
Region    
The West 61.4 26.3 12.4 
The Center 49.4 25.3 25.3 
The South 55.8 25.1 19.1 
The East 54.2 23.9 22.0 
Opportunity to earn additionally    
 
Yes, enough to ensure normal life 
85.2 3.7 11.1 
Yes, but not enough to ensure normal life 68.3 20.9 10.8 
No 51.6 26.6 21.7 
Going abroad to fill up family budget    
Constantly 81.8 12.1 6.1 
Sometimes 69.2 21.9 8..9 
No 53.0 26.0 21.0 
 
 
                                                    
i Our model resembles the one of Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997), although with a few 
substantial amendments. 
Firstly, we let the rent pool be variable. If its size depends on the government’s efforts, the latter gets 
interested in maximization of the total rent. Under sufficiently weak democratic institutions, this interest can 
outweigh the one in well-being of the population, so the state ends up “captured”: government persuades 
policies increasing the common pool of rents in exchange to the contributions made by rent-seeking 
businesses. In particular, it is interested in restraining the rent seeking for the sake of preventing the 
overappropriation – just as if it would be an owner of this pool. Along with sufficient political choice, this 
interest makes such government a potential reformer interested in the partial reforms that maximize the rent, 
but not in their completion that could maximize public well-being. Therefore, in such a model, under the weak 
democratic institutions reforms remain partial even if the government is “strong”.  
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Secondly, we point out that the model of Dixit et al. treats government as an agent bringing the rent 
to principals. But actually it is endowed with discretionary power of distributing this rent among the lobbyists, 
which makes it their boss. If we go a little bit further, and remark that in reality not the government, but the 
rent seeking businesses are active extractors of rent, we end up with a multi-agent model that we consider 
closer to the Ukrainian realities.  
Third, we do not stick with a fixed norm of sharing the rent between principal and agents. Then, the 
principal-agent relations become paternalistic, since the amount of rent left for an agent becomes subject to 
negotiations and can be traded for loyalty of the clients. The “soft budget constrain” (SBC), described by 
Kornai (1986) as the state paternalism towards enterprises under central planning, is an example particularly 
important for our case. 
ii The social expenditures were not prioritized in the budget (Figure 2). Indeed, the social liabilities 
inherited from Soviet times were huge. They were further magnified by the series of populist laws adopted by 
the Parliament during the first years of independence. But here the “soft” rule of law revealed in full: in deed, 
none of the state budgets respected these laws.  
In fact, the social assistance, although substantial, did not prevail over the direct subsidies to 
enterprises (“national economy support”) with the exception of 1993 and 1995-97. But exactly those years 
the subsidies to enterprises were provided mostly in the indirect form. Also, the budget deficit 1993 was still 
63% lower than the expenditures “for the national economy” in the same year. In 1992 the planned direct 
subsidies also exceeded the deficit, and in addition were overfilled by 213%. Besides, the actual execution of 
the social articles was often incomplete (Figure 3) and there was a strong tendency to delay the respective 
payments, which meant their devaluation giving to very high inflation rate. 
iii “… the privatization process was most intensive in trade and public catering with 29917 privatized 
entities (44.8% of the overall number of privatized entities in all branches), in consumer services — 11859 
entities (17.8%), industry — 6974 entities (10.5%), construction — 3293 (4.9%) and housing and municipal 
facilities sector — 3072 assets (4.6%). “ (ibid). The trade (including public catering) and services sectors 
were mostly composed of the small enterprises subject to direct buy-out (“Group A”). In these sectors 72.8% 
and 74.4% of the overall number of the privatized entities were privatized through the above mentioned 
methods. “The most common privatization method for large-size and medium-size enterprises in industry 
(60.8% of the overall number of the privatized enterprises) and transport (74.4% of privatized entities) has 
been the sale of shares in open joint stock companies (OJSC). The share of this method in privatization of 
construction projects and agricultural assets was high (44.6% and 43.1% respectively). Sale of shares in 
OJSCs was rarely used in the other branches of economy.” (Voronkova, 2000) 
iv To be sure, some of the IMF conditions were targeted at the micro level too. But they constituted 
just minor parts of huge memorandums contained up to 89 points. The government often ignored them, since 
they could undermine the sources of arbiters’ power and/or rents. But the IMF always prioritized its standard 
macroeconomic benchmarks, so delaying in the institutional and structural reforms did not affect further 
financing. Besides, when the IFOs insisted on structural reforms, they were mostly the ones aimed at 
restraining the possible paternalism and privileges for the households. Although significant, these problems 
were still of secondary importance comparing to the paternalism towards enterprises. Lunina and Vinzenc 
(1999) estimated the total subsidies that went to enterprises in 1997 as 20-25% of GDP. There were no 
“informal” or “implicit” subsidies to the ordinary people, except for a cheap energy. But unlike enterprises the 
households paid for energy exclusively in cash, and more than 60% was paid in time. This is of course very 
low from the point of view of a healthy market economy, but still better than just 32% of electricity paid in 
cash at the end of 1999 (Dubrovskiy, 2002). Also, these subsidies were much less distorting, because the 
labor incentives remained very strong.  
Plausibly, the respective harsh discussions were used by the government to advert the IFO’s 
attention from real sources of rents used by the BAGs. 
